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The Trouble With T-Shirts: Merchandise
Bootlegging in the Music Industry
by ANDREW E. CLARK*
Sometime in the late spring of 1964, two clothing manufactur-
ers, Puritan Sportswear Corporation and Puritan Fashions
Corporation, appeared before United States District Judge
Frederick van Pelt Bryan in a trademark controversy.' A few
months earlier, the Beatles, described by Judge Bryan as "the
shaggy-headed English quartet which has created such a furor
among the American teenage population,"2 had made their first
live appearance in the United States. Puritan Fashions, seek-
ing to exploit this craze, became the Beatles' American licen-
see for clothing merchandise and commenced a large-scale
promotional campaign to market t-shirts, sweatshirts, and sim-
ilar items featuring the Beatles.' Fearing injury to its reputa-
tion as a manufacturer and seller of high quality clothes,
Puritan Sportwear moved to enjoin Fashions from using the
* B.A., Williams College, 1980; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1983: law
clerk, Hon. Stephanie K. Seymour, United States of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
1. Puritan Sportswear Corp. v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 232 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
2. Id. at 551.
3. Id. at 551-52. Clothes were not the only products on which the Beatles' names
and pictures were licensed to appear. Upon their arrival in America, the group was
deluged with licensing offers, many of which were accepted. Author Geoffrey Stokes
describes the scene as follows:
The flight itself was a hubbub of activity. In addition to the squads of British
reporters accompanying the tour at their papers' expense ... quick-thinking
American businessmen had also booked seats. Smelling money, they could
not wait for the Beatles to get to America. [Beatles manager Brian] Epstein,
who was already in the process of setting up an American-based company to
license the Beatles' name for various products, met with them in relays. His
concern, he said, was that the Beatles' names and pictures be associated only
with "quality products," and he turned down those that didn't fit the image he
wanted the band to project. Among the offers he felt obliged to decline was
one for an "official Beatles" sanitary napkin.
Virtually everything else was approved, however, and the Beatles' progress
was heralded by such dubious devices as official Beatles lunch boxes, T-shirts,
pajamas, pants, sweat shirts, three-button tennis shirts and, of course, wigs.
G. STOKES, THE BEATLES (1980), (reprinted in ROLLING STONE, Dec. 25, 1980--Jan. 8,
1981 (double issue), at 107, 110).
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word "Puritan" in connection with the sale and distribution of
Beatles merchandise.4
Judge Bryan denied the motion. He found that there was in-
sufficient evidence of consumer confusion as to the origin of
the Beatles goods and that Sportswear failed to show actual
injury in any event.5 Concluding that the potential harm the
injunction would cause to Fashions outweighed any benefit
Sportswear might receive, he opined that "[t] he Beatle aberra-
tion is presumably an ephemeral and temporary one. Fashions
has invested large sums in the Beatle promotion and has had a
rush of business as a result. In all likelihood it has only a lim-
ited period within which to realize on its investment . *."..6
As history would have it, of course, Judge Bryan could not
have been more wrong. While one can only speculate as to the
fate of the two "Puritan" companies, the fate of the Beatles,
who went on to become "more popular than Jesus Christ,"7 is a
well-known tale.8 Moreover, the merchandising of "shaggy-
haired" pop music groups, which Puritan Sportswear viewed
with such abhorrence, is today a multi-million dollar industry.9
4. 232 F. Supp. at 551-52. The essence of Sportswear's position, according to Judge
Bryan, was that it viewed "with strong distaste and strenuously object[ed] to the use
of the word 'Puritan' in any combination in connection with the promotion and market-
ing of Beatle goods." It sought to have the word "disassociated entirely" from the
Beatle promotion. Id. at 552-53.
5. Id. at 553-54. Judge Bryan noted:
There were some customers who seemed to be upset that Sportswear might
be handling such undignified merchandise as the Beatles line but [they] were
quickly reassured by Sportswear. Indeed, Sportswear published an advertise-
ment disassociating itself in no uncertain terms from anything having to do
with the Beatles....
... It must be granted that to many people at least the Beatle goods are
singularly unattractive. But Sportswear has shown no actualinjury and, even
assuming some confusion in origin, any damage it may suffer is entirely
speculative.
Id.
6. Id. at 555.
7. STOKES, supra note 3, at 118. Lennon made the remark in February 1966 during
an interview with Maureen Cleave of the London Evening Standard. It was reprinted
that summer in a "pulpy teenage magazine" called Datebook and set off a wave of
reaction, resulting in the banning of Beatles music on a number of radio stations and
mass bonfires at which Beatles records were burned. Id. Taken in context, Lennon's
actual comment was "Christianity will go. It will vanish and shrink. I needn't argue
about that, I'm right and will be proved right. We're more popular than Jesus Christ
right now." Id.
8. See id.
9. Howrey, Dealers, Bootleggers Step Up 'T-Shirt Wars', ROLLING STONE, Oct. 16,
1980, at 36 [hereinafter cited as T-Shirt Wars]; Pond, The Sticky Business of Concert
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Almost twenty years after the Puritan decision, and some four-
teen years after the group disbanded, Beatles t-shirts, jackets,
posters, and buttons remain widely available in record stores,
bookstores, gift-shops, and mail order outlets across the coun-
try.10 Their still-active contemporaries, the Rolling Stones, re-
portedly grossed an estimated $40 million in t-shirt sales on
their recent United States concert tour." Although few groups
have approached the Rolling Stones' level of commercial suc-
cess, sales of collateral merchandise today account for a signifi-
cant portion of the net incomes of most popular recording
artists-second only to record sales for many performers.1
2
Merchandising, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 12, 1981, at 56 [hereinafter cited as Concert
Merchandising ].
10. Merchandise featuring the individual members of the Beatles as solo artists
also is widely available. Even the late John Lennon remains immortalized on products
such as posters, buttons, bumperstickers, and t-shirts. One mail order company in-
vites prospective purchasers to picture themselves with "Kaleidoscope Eyes," wearing
"Lennon Specs ... the original English workman's sunglass . . .One size fits all."
ROLLING STONE, May 26, 1983, at 75 (advertisement). That biological death and com-
mercial death are two different events is well illustrated by the present fame of The
Doors, a late sixties rock band that broke up long before merchandising became a big
business. More than ten years after its demise, the group is more popular than ever
before, and t-shirts picturing the late Jim Morrison, The Doors' erstwhile leader, are a
hot item today among young rock fans, many of whom were in kindergarten during the
band's heyday. See generally Breslin, Jim Morrison, 1981: Renew My Subscription to
the Resurrection, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 17, 1981, at 31 (describing the new popularity of
Morrison and The Doors).
11. Loder & Pond, Stones' Payday, ROLLING STONE, Jan. 21, 1982, at 33 [hereinafter
cited as Stones' Payday ]. The twelve-week tour during the fall of 1981 played to more
than two million people who paid $15 each for tickets. It was, at the time, the most
profitable tour in rock and roll history. Id. See also Trademark Attorneys Get Tough, 4
NAT'L L.J. 1, at 8 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Trademark Attorneys]. Merchandising
income reportedly almost matched ticket sales in some cities, with sales averaging
more than one t-shirt (at $10 a piece) per customer. Between ticket sales, merchan-
dise sales, spurred record sales, video broadcast revenues, and a tour sponsorship ar-
rangement with a perfume manufacturer, Jovan, the Stones took home an estimated
$50 million. Stones' Payday at 33-34.
12. See Concert Merchandising, supra note 9; Stones' Payday, supra note 11.
While concert tours generate substantial revenues, their production costs are ex-
tremely high. For many groups and performers, merchandise sales at concerts deter-
mine whether the tour is profitable or loses money. As Styx manager Derek Sutton
put it, "If we weren't selling T-shirts, we couldn't afford to be on tour. A little more
than half our tour profits this year have come from merchandising .... Concert Mer-
chandising, supra at 56; see also Rock 'n'Retail: Styx On Tour, 130 N.Y. Times, Aug. 16,
1981, (Magazine), at 32, 44 [hereinafter cited as Rock In' Retail]; cf. Hickling, Court
Ruling a Blow to T-Shirt Bootleggers, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 4, 1982, at 38 (merchandis-
ing revenues increasingly important in economics of touring) [hereinafter cited as
Bootleggers ].
The merchandise boom is not limited to the music field. Merchandising is big busi-
ness throughout the entertainment industry and in other areas as well. See generally
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Not surprisingly, the lucrative nature of this business has at-
tracted a host of entrepreneurs out to capitalize on the vast
merchandising market. Using inexpensive supplies and oper-
ating out of trucks, vans, private residences, basements, and
business backrooms, they manufacture and distribute low-cost
bootleg merchandise featuring the names and likenesses of
popular rock performers without authorization or approval
from the performers involved.13 In short order, this practice
has mushroomed into a full-scale underground industry, gen-
erating millions of dollars annually in illicit profits. 14 Although
recent legal efforts on the part of artists and their licensees
have curtailed the problem somewhat, 5 bootleg t-shirt ped-
dlers maintain a nightly omnipresence outside concert halls
and arenas throughout the country.
This article examines the problem of merchandise bootleg-
ging in the music industry. 6 After exploring the background of
Grimes & Battersby, The Protection of Merchandising Properties, 69 TRADE-MARK REP.
431 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Grimes); McCarthy, Important Trends in Trademark
and Unfair Competition Law During the Decade of the 1970s, 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 93,
125 & nn.107-08 (1981). Merchandise from the motion picture "Star Wars," for instance,
has generated some $1.5 billion in gross retail sales. Scanlon, George Lucas Wants to
Play Guitar, ROLLING STONE, July 21-Aug. 4, 1983 (double issue), at 7. Two months
prior to the release of the movie "Superman," Warner Bros. had already licensed over
100 manufacturers to market nearly 1000 products. Grimes, supra at 437. The televi-
sion show "Happy Days" has spawned more than fifty products. Id. at 435.
Generally, merchandising has been applied most successfully to low-priced impulse
products such as posters, buttons, t-shirts, toys, games, badges, patches, and the like.
Id. at 434-35. One of the oldest and most successful merchandising properties is
"Mickey Mouse," whose products include hats, watches, drinking glasses, placemats,
posters, coloring books, toothbrushes, combs, dolls, panties, and shower curtains. It
has been estimated that, over the past fifty years, the "Mickey Mouse" name or image
has been applied to over 50,000 different products, and, today, more than 200 world-
wide manufacturers are licensed to produce "Mickey Mouse" products. Id. at 435.
13. See infra notes 25-60 and accompanying text.
14. See T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9 (bootleggers gross estimated $50 million plus
annually); see also Appleson, 'John Doe TROs' Stem Illegal T-Shirt Sales, 68 A.B.A.J. 30
(1982) (millions lost to bootleggers over years). One bootlegger, Great American
Screen, reportedly grossed $60,000 to $75,000 in illicit t-shirt sales at a single Rolling
Stones concert in Philadelphia. Musidor, B.V. v. Great American Screen, 658 F.2d 60,
66 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982). See generally infra notes 25-60 and
accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 61-118 and accompanying text.
16. Although this article focuses primarily on the music industry, the issues raised
have application in a wide range of fields. For instance, actors, comedians, movie stu-
dios, authors, publishers, athletic teams, schools, public figures, cartoonists, and even
manufacturers of popular products such as Nike shoes or Coors beer, all have an inter-
est in retaining the exclusive right to market the name or likeness of their product on
collateral merchandise. See generally Grimes, supra note 12 (discussing legal mecha-
nisms for protecting merchandising properties); Winner, Right of Identity: Right of
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the problem, the article discusses recent efforts to combat mer-
chandise bootlegging and analyzes the legal theories that have
been employed in such efforts. The article contends that pres-
ently existing remedies are inadequate and suggests that a leg-
islative solution is needed. The article concludes by proposing
the general form that such legislation should take if it is to ad-
dress the problem effectively.
I
"T-Shirt Wars": The Bootleg Problem
The problem of merchandise bootlegging in the music indus-
try can fairly be characterized as an aspect of the larger, wide-
spread phenomenon of commercial counterfeiting. 7 Although
the proliferation of counterfeit designer jeans and fake Cartier
watches has been well publicized, 8 the scope and severity of
the problem run much deeper. Modern commercial counter-
feiters operate on a vast international scale, with elaborate or-
ganizational structures and sophisticated systems of
distribution. 9 The extent of their success has been alarming,
resulting in losses of an estimated $16 billion to legitimate
American businesses in 1981 alone.20 No longer restricted
Publicity and Protection for a Trademark's "Persona," 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 193 (1981)
(advocating protection for "fad" value of trademark's "persona").
17. See generally Rakoff & Wolf, Commercial Counterfeiting and the Proposed
Trademark Counterfeiting Act, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145 (1982) (comprehensive discus-
sion and analysis of commercial counterfeiting and proposed remedial legislation)
[hereinafter cited as Rakoff ]; Walker, A Program to Combat International Commercial
Counterfeiting, 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 117 (1980) (discussion of commercial counterfeit-
ing problem and steps taken to combat it).
18. See Rakoff, supra note 17, at 150-53 (citing newspaper and magazine articles).
19. Id. at 149. The counterfeiters' pattern of covert conduct mirrors that employed
by organized crime in connection with drug trafficking. J. Bainton, Temporary Re-
straining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions: It's Largely in the Lawyering 21 (1982)
(unpublished manuscript). There is some evidence that organized crime is directly
involved in commercial counterfeiting. Rakoff, supra note 17, at 152 n.54.
20. Rakoff, supra note 17, at 151. In the fashion industry alone, illegal profits from
commercial counterfeiting reached an estimated $450 million in 1980. Id. at 161 n.47.
Similarly, Cartier president Ralph Destino has estimated that as many as 300,000 fake
Cartier watches are sold annually-substantially more than Cartier itself produces.
Morris, Faking It, ArrENZIONE, Feb. 1981, at 38, 40. It is not uncommon for counterfeit-
ers to apply well known trademarks to types of merchandise that are not even made by
the legitimate companies. Id. at 41. The Cartier trademark, for example, has been
found on calculators, even though the company has never manufactured any electronic
products. Id. Cheap t-shirts, emblazoned with the names of Gucci, Dior, and other
clothing and accessory makers are hawked as designer tops on street corners in New
York and other cities, although such companies 'would never condescend to make T-
shirts." Id.
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solely to luxury and designer goods such as apparel, jewelry,
cosmetics, sporting goods, and records, counterfeits have
turned up in a wide range of health and safety related items,
including drugs, fertilizers, chemicals, glasses, computer com-
ponents, automobile parts, and even aircraft parts.2 '
The growing threat of commercial counterfeiting prompted a
group of twenty-five American and European manufacturers to
band together to form the International Anti-Counterfeiting
Coalition. Created in 1978, the Coalition, now comprising more
than seventy members, has attempted to combat the problem
through cooperation with law enforcement and consumer pro-
tection groups both here and abroad.22 Among its achieve-
ments has been the introduction of a proposed Trademark
Counterfeiting Act ,now pending in Congress.
23
In the music industry, the counterfeiting of record labels be-
came so widespread that in 1962 Congress passed specific legis-
lation to address the problem. 24 While record piracy remains a
serious concern within the music industry, performers today-
particularly rock and roll stars-are devoting increasing atten-
tion to the proliferation of counterfeit merchandise bearing
their names and likenesses.25 Bootleg t-shirts, jerseys, but-
tons, posters, and other items are sold by the thousands
outside concert halls where the artists are performing. The
concern is understandable given the amount of money at
stake. Winterland Concessions Company, one of the largest li-
censed manufacturers of music-related t-shirts, grossed ap-
proximately $15 million in total sales in the year ending in
September 198126 and bootleggers reportedly took home at
21. See Rakoff, supra note 17, at 152-53 (discussing examples); Walker, supra note
17, at 117-18 (same).
22. Walker, supra note 17, at 119; Rakoff, supra note 17, at 147 n.12.
23. Rakoff, supra note 17, at 147-48. Hearings were held on the proposed Act in
1982, but no further Congressional action was taken. It was reintroduced in the 98th
Congress, with a few changes, and at this writing is still pending in committee. See S.
875, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 3646 (1983); H.R. 2447, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REc. 1861 (1983). For an in-depth section-by-section analysis of the proposed
Act, see Rakoff, supra, at 177-225.
24. Rakoff, supra note 17, at 170; see 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (1976). The statute was
amended in 1982 to provide for stiffer penalties. Record piracy is now a felony with a
maximum sentence of five years. Rakoff, supra, at 170 & n.197. Nevertheless, counter-
feiters continue to produce bootleg records and tapes worth an estimated $6 billion
each year. Id. at 151 n.47.
25. See infra notes 61-118 and accompanying text.
26. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1207 (N.D. Ill. 1981);




Although rock merchandise, both authorized and unauthor-
ized, is sold at retail outlets and through the mail,28 the vast
majority of sales occur at concert sites-about ninety percent
in Winterland's case.29 Such sales are particularly important
to rock performers; with the high costs of touring, merchandise
revenues often represent the difference between a profitable
and unprofitable tour.3" Yet even before the young concert-
goer lays eyes on the array of official merchandise stockpiled at
concession booths inside the arena, he inevitably encounters
one or more of the scores of peddlers who roam the parking lot
hawking bootleg t-shirts.3 1 As a Winterland attorney has ob-
served, "If or every shirt sold on the outside, we lose one on
the inside."32
In terms of sheer numbers, the bootlegging problem is phe-
nomenal. Industry insiders claim that it is not unusual for sev-
eral hundred bootleggers to show up for a big concert.33 At a
recent Billy Joel concert in New York's Madison Square Gar-
den, for instance, more than 5,000 shirts were seized from some
200 peddlers. Yet, according to Jules Zalon, the attorney who
conducted the seizure operation, seizure was effected on less
than half of the peddlers actually on the streets.' Indeed, it
has been noted that "there are sometimes so many bootleggers
at one show that it would take a National Guard unit to serve
them all. ' '35
1980). Winterland's licensors include: the Rolling Stones, Foghat, Pat Benatar, the Jef-
ferson Starship, the Electric Light Orchestra, Tom Petty & the Heartbreakers, Santana,
Journey, REO Speedwagon, Bob Seger, Black Sabbath, Blue Oyster Cult, the Grateful
Dead, Ted Nugent, Sammy Hagar, Aerosmith, Fleetwood Mac, Heart, the Doobie
Brothers, and Bruce Springsteen. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1204-05.
27. T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9.
28. See supra note 10.
29. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1207; Creative Screen Design, 210 U.S.P.Q. at 8.
30. See supra note 12.
31. See generally Winterland Concessions Co. v. Creative Screen Design, Ltd., 214
U.S.P.Q. 188, 190 (N.D. Ill. 1981); T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9. According to Winterland
Executive Vice President Donald Hunt, the legitimate merchandise is sold inside the
hall because of the security and safety considerations stemming from the cash nature
of the sales. Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 190.
32. Appleson, supra note 14 (quoting Michael Krassner, counsel for Winterland).
33. T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9 (quoting Bruce Palley, director of financial affairs
for Leber-Krebs management company).
34. Second Affidavit of Jules D. Zalon, Counsel for Plaintiff, at 2, Brockum Int'l v.
Great Am. Screen Design, Ltd., No. 82 Civ. 2948 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Zalon Affidavit II].
35. T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9.
No. 1]
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 6
Far from being haphazard about their operations, the boot-
leggers are sophisticated and well organized. About six or
eight major printers located in different parts of the country
are believed to be the chief suppliers of bootleg goods. 6 Using
inexpensive cotton shirts imported from Pakistan, they silk-
screen onto the shirts the names and trademarks of various
artists and groups and send the shirts, usually by air freight
and using fictitious names, to distributors around the coun-
try.3 The distributors then follow a particular performer from
city to city throughout an entire tour. Many travel in caravans
with their own crews of sellers, while others employ individu-
als locally to make the actual sales. 38 Arriving at the concert
site several hours before the show begins, the distributors park
their vans about a mile from the arena and distribute their
merchandise to sub-distributors who, in turn, sell or consign
the shirts to the peddlers.39
36. Zalon Affidavit II, supra note 34, at 2; see T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9 (east coast
printing houses allegedly supply most bootleggers).
37. See generally Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1208-12 (detailed discussion of methods of
production and distribution). See also Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 189-90
(same).
38. Zalon Affidavit II, supra note 34, at 2. See, e.g., Creative Screen Design, 214
U.S.P.Q. at 189 (defendant ran crew); Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1211 (same). Zalon de-
scribes the tenacity of these bootleg caravans as follows:
[DI uring a recent series of seizure actions which I instituted for one group, I
found the same people in almost every city I visited. One particular caravan,
carrying a large group of sellers was seen in San Antonio, Houston, Baton
Rouge, Shreveport, Mobile and Jackson, all within the course of ten days! In
fact, two of them were jailed for contempt for having flaunted the temporary
restraining order and continuing to sell counterfeit shirts after having been
served. Another peddler told me personally, "Well, you didn't catch me in San
Antonio yesterday, so I came to Houston to give you another chance." That
person, arrested in Houston, was subsequently seen in Baton Rouge at my
client's concert site.
Zalon Affidavit II, supra note 34, at 2.
39. Zalon Affidavit II, supra note 34, at 2. According to Zalon, the shirts may
change hands five or six times between their removal from the "mother ship" (i.e. the
truck or van) and their ultimate sale to the concertgoers. Plaintiffs Brief, at 2, Brock-
um Int'l v. Various John Does (unsubmitted draft) [hereinafter cited as Zalon Brief].
The actual peddlers may possess no more than a half dozen shirts at any time. Id.
This procedure has come about primarily in response to the seizure orders now com-
monly secured at concert sites, see infra notes 65-101 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing enforcement efforts at concert sites). In the past, bootleggers would receive their
shirts directly from the mother ships and sell them out of duffle bags containing as
many as 100 shirts. As a result, peddlers were highly visible and virtually immobile,
and thus easy prey for marshals or other security officers enforcing the seizure orders.
Zalon Brief, supra at 2. Under the new system, peddlers are highly mobile and much
less conspicuous. This writer has on more than one occasion observed bootleg ped-
dlers successfully elude pursuing process servers following a short footrace through
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Because they are unlicensed and deal only in cash, bootleg-
gers, unlike performers or their authorized merchandisers, can
avoid taxes, rentals, and licensing fees. 40 Considering this fact,
and their minimal production and overhead costs,4 ' bootleg-
gers can afford to sell their shirts for a few dollars less than the
official merchandise.42 In order to place shirts in the concert
hall, an authorized merchandiser must pay a rental of any-
where from thirty-five to forty-five percent of the gross.4 The
royalty to the artist generally ranges between ten and twenty
percent." When production, shipping, and overhead costs are
added in, the merchandiser's profit comes to no more than ten
to twenty percent-a dollar or two for every ten dollar shirt
an arena parking lot. Even if a peddler is caught, no more than a few t-shirts are likely
to be seized. Given the low cost and quality of the shirts, such losses are fairly consid-
ered a reasonable "cost of doing business." Id. Cf. Appleson, supra note 14 ("front
guys" with only a few shirts sent to test enforcement).
40. T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9.
41. First Affidavit of Jules D. Zalon, Counsel for Plaintiff, at 2, Brockum Int'l v.
Great Am. Screen Design, Ltd., No. 82 Civ. 2948 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Zalon Affidavit I]. Although the mass production of silk screened shirts gener-
ally requires an automatic print machine, cf. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1210, screens and
inks are standard priced staples, Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 189, and the
blank shirts themselves cost only slightly more than a dollar each. Sileo, 528 F. Supp.
at 1210 (defendant purchased 58,776 blank shirts for $69,046). As Zalon points out,
"anyone with a silk screening operation [i.e. any printing house] can become a boot-
legger simply by producing a new 'screen'." Zalon Affidavit I, supra, at 2.
42. In 1979-80, Winterland t-shirts were sold for $8.00 each; jerseys were $11.50. Cre-
ative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 189. During that same period, bootleg prices were
around $5.00 for t-shirts and $7.00 for jerseys. Id. Prices today are generally somewhat
higher. In 1981, legitimate t-shirts were being sold for $10.00. See Concert Merchandis-
ing, supra note 9, at 56; Stones' Payday, supra note 11, at 33.
43. See Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1207; Concert Merchandising, supra note 9, at 56. In
one twelve month period during which it grossed $15 million in total sales, Winterland
paid about $3 million to halls and auditoriums. Another $3 million plus was paid to
artists as royalties. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1207-08.
The concert halls located in larger, heavily unionized cities tend to retain a greater
percentage of the gross than their counterparts in smaller towns. Concert Merchandis-
ing, supra note 9, at 56. At New York's Madison Square Garden, the hall reportedly
takes 55%. Id. The hall's share of the money is in turn divided among the hall, the
concessionaire, and the vendor. The concessionaire, who has contracted for the exclu-
sive right to handle concession sales, generally pays the hall 10-15% of the gross for the
privilege. The vendors, employees of the concessionaire who man the booths, also may
take around 15% (20% at Los Angeles' Forum), leaving the concessionaire itself with
around 10-20%. Id. at 60.
44. See Concert Merchandising, supra note 9, at 60. In 1979-80, the average royalty
paid by Winterland to its licensors was 17%. Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at
189. Big name performers may command a larger royalty. It has been estimated that,
during their 1981 tour, the Rolling Stones' share of merchandising proceeds amounted
to 25%. Stones' Payday, supfa note 11, at 33.
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sold.45 On a night that grosses $50,000 in t-shirt sales, the per-
former and merchandiser together may take away no more
than $10,000 to $15,000.1 Although bootleggers tend to keep
less than detailed financial records,47 it is no doubt safe to as-
sume that their profit margin is substantially higher-probably
more than forty percent of the retail price for each shirt sold.48
Given the lucrative nature of their business, bootleggers
have taken careful measures to protect their interests. As art-
ists and merchandisers have stepped up enforcement efforts,49
bootleggers have adapted accordingly, adopting increasingly
flexible and sophisticated methods of operation. At concerts,
peddlers maintain low visibility despite their numbers by wan-
dering through the parking lots carrying only a handful of
shirts. If a seller's supply is seized, he loses only a few shirts,
and continues about his business with a fresh supply.50 The
evading process is further advanced by such reportedly com-
45. Stones' Payday, supra note 11, at 60. In 1979-80, Winterland's profit on sales of
t-shirts and jerseys at concerts averaged 15%. Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at
189. According to Styx manager Derek Sutton, production costs alone for Styx t-shirts
amount to $3.00 a shirt, 30% of the retail price. Concert Merchandising, supra note 9, at
60.
46. See generally Concert Merchandising, supra note 9, at 56.
47. See infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text.
48. See T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9 (bootleggers have higher profit margin than li-
censed dealers). One bootlegger, called as a witness in Creative Screen Design, 214
U.S.P.Q. 188, testified that his profit for the sale of bootleg t-shirts was about $6.00 per
dozen or 50 cents a shirt ($8.00 per dozen for jerseys). Id. at 189. Unless he paid his
sellers extremely well, however, his testimony appears less than convincing. In fact,
one of the defendants in that case, Arnold Goldzweig, was found to have reaped a sub-
stantially higher profit rate for his own bootleg sales, well above even Winterland's
15% rate.
Goldzweig was the president of Creative, a bootleg printing house, and ran his own
distribution crew as well. Using fictitious names, he purchased shirts from Creative at
the regular wholesale price of $23.00 per dozen (about $2.00 a shirt) and distributed
them to his crews, which sold them at concert sites around the country for $5.00 each.
Id. Goldzweig thus realized a gross profit of around $3.00 a shirt, 60% of the retail
price. Subtracting his wholesale costs from a gross income of $103,452 for sales of t-
shirts and jerseys over a fifteen month period, the court found that Goldzweig realized
a gross profit of $62,603. Id. Even assuming a deduction of 20% for distribution costs
and employee salaries, Goldzweig netted a substantial 40% profit on every sale.
Moreover, assuming it paid about $1.00 each for blank t-shirts, see supra note 41
(blank shirts cost slightly more than a dollar), Goldzweig's company, Creative, also
reaped a substantial profit from its sales to Goldzweig and other distributors-about a
dollar per shirt,.not including production costs. Unfortunately for Winterland, Crea-
tive went into bankruptcy before any damages could be recovered against it. Winter-
land did, however, obtain a substantial recovery against the individual defendants
Arnold and Allan Goldzweig. See infra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 61-118 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 39.
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mon practices as "renting" vending vests from concessionaires
and bribing the low-paid "rent-a-cops" on security duty."'
The printing houses have proven even more adept at avoid-
ing prosecution. 2 Silk-screening is a very simple process that
can be carried out in virtually any location-a private home, a
warehouse, a business basement or backroom.53 Businesses
that appear wholly legitimate may in fact be fronts for illegal
bootlegging. Printing companies have been known to keep
screens secreted during the day and print bootleg shirts on
night-shifts. 54 If discovered by investigators hired by perform-
ers or their licensees, such businesses can easily go "under-
ground," moving to a new location and continuing operations
under a different name.5 When a suit is brought against them,
they often are able to hide or destroy their equipment, mer-
chandise, and business records, if any were kept, making it dif-
ficult to prove infringement and virtually impossible to recover
damages.5 6 Thus, while recent enforcement efforts have
achieved some degree of success,5 7 by and large, merchandise
bootleggers have managed to avoid serious harm and their in-
51. T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9. Serving seizure orders on t-shirt bootleggers also
can be dangerous. Depending on the circumstances, a t-shirt peddler confronted by a
would-be process server may be more inclined to fight than flee-particularly if the
person attempting to carry out the seizure is an ordinary layperson authorized to help
enforce the order rather than a U.S. Marshal. But see United States v. Giampino, 680
F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant convicted for assaulting federal marshal during at-
tempted seizure of bootleg t-shirts; conviction reversed because of failure to instruct
jury as to lesser-included offense). Moreover, according to industry representatives,
some of the bootleggers are armed. T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9.
52. But see infra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
53. See generally 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRrrANNICA 1084 (15th ed. 1974) (describing
silk-screen process).
54. See, e.g., Musidor, 658 F.2d at 63 (screens hidden in basement; printing done by
night shifts); Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1210 (printing location kept secret to frustrate en-
forcement efforts).
55. Zalon Affidavit I, supra note 41, at 2.
56. See e.g., Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1210 (defendant kept no written records, de-
stroyed printing equipment just prior to suit); Creative Screen Design, 210 U.S.P.Q. at 9
(plaintiffs' investigator found records in defendants' trash). See infra notes 176-96 and
accompanying text.
57. See generally infra notes 61-118 and accompanying text. Winterland president
Dell Furano has estimated that the extent of potential sales lost to bootleggers
dropped from around 40% in 1979 to around 15% in 1981 as a result of increased legal
action against bootleggers. Concert Merchandising, supra note 9, at 61. During the
Rolling Stones' Chicago concerts in November, 1981, at which about 100 shirts were
seized, legitimate vendors reportedly told marshals that their sales were up 80%. Ap-
pleson, supra note 14.
COMM/ENT L. J.
dustry continues to thrive.58
For the artists, this problem is more than one of money
alone. Performers have a substantial interest in controlling the
style and quality of products bearing their names.59 Although
most certainly are out to make money as well, their careers are
highly dependent on their reputations and the image they pro-
ject to the public. This interest-essentially the artist's "busi-
ness goodwill"-is not readily measurable in monetary terms,
yet it can be severely damaged through the proliferation of
low-quality, poorly designed bootleg merchandise. As one
group's manager said, "I wish I had a nickel for every time a
kid walked into one of our shows wearing a cheap Pakistani t-
shirt, then looked at the [official] merchandise and said, 'I've
been ripped off . , "60
II
Of T-Shirts and TROs: Legal Enforcement
Efforts
Legal action against bootleggers was slow in coming. Boot-
leggers were making big money selling shirts before many art-
ists even were aware of the potential market for such
merchandise.6 1 Although initial enforcement efforts may have
been prompted by the reputation damage suffered by artists,
the large-scale enforcement campaigns that began in the late
seventies owe their genesis to the profitability of the industry
and the realization on the part of managers and merchandisers
that legal protection is a worthwhile and necessary cost of do-
ing business. 62 As Winterland general counsel Michael Krass-
58. See Concert Merchandising, supra note 9, at 60 (bootleggers not as threatening,
but still "thorn in the side" of merchandisers).
59. See generally infra notes 155-74 and accompanying text (discussing right of
publicity). Even where money is a factor, an artist's interest in controlling the market-
ing of his name and likeness may extend beyond personal financial gain. For example,
proceeds from the sales of t-shirts featuring Jackson Browne, Dan Fogelberg, the
Grateful Dead, Linda Ronstadt, and Bonnie Raitt, among others, have gone to the Pa-
cific Alliance, a political organization opposed to nuclear power. See, e.g., ROLLING
STONE, Nov. 12, 1981, at 84 (advertisement).
60. Concert Merchandising, supra note 9, at 60-61.
61. Id. at 60.
62. See id. at 61 (costs of legal action against bootleggers increasingly worthwhile);
Trademark Attorneys, supra note 11, at 8 (merchandisers consider "trademark protec-
tion a fixed cost of doing business instead of legal oddity"); cf. Bootleggers, supra note
12 (legal efforts stepped up because merchandising revenues increasingly important in
economics of touring).
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ner commented, "[i]t was a matter of the money getting big
enough and the bootlegging getting overwhelming enough."63
A. Policing the Parking Lots: Enforcement at Concert Sites
Although at least one early lawsuit was brought directly
against a t-shirt manufacturer,64 the bulk of the early efforts-
as well as most of the legal activity today-was aimed at the
most visible aspect of the bootlegging operation: the peddlers
themselves. Such actions normally commence through the is-
suance of a "John Doe" seizure order, an ex parte temporary
restraining order (TRO), prohibiting certain unnamed and as
yet unknown individuals from selling merchandise bearing the
performer's name or likeness outside the arena where the per-
former is scheduled to appear.65
The orders further authorize United States marshals, fre-
quently augmented by the plaintiff's attorney and designated
individuals acting under his supervision, 66 to seize such mer-
chandise and hold it pending a later hearing.67 The orders gen-
erally are obtained anywhere from a few days to a few weeks
63. Trademark Attorneys, supra note 11, at 8. In another article, Krassner ex-
plained that "It] he problem of bootlegged T-shirts had been mushrooming until coun-
terfeiting was about to take over the industry. . . .We had to try to find a way to stop
it." Appleson, supra note 14 (quoting Michael Krassner, counsel for Winterland).
64. See Musidor, 658 F.2d 60 (complaint filed in 1978).
65. See, e.g., Brockum Int'l, Inc. v. Various John Does, 551 F. Supp. 1054, 1055 (E.D.
Wis. 1982) (relief granted); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Geisel, 511 F. Supp. 310, 311
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (relief denied); Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Various John Does, 507 F. Supp. 63,
64 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (relief denied); Joel v. Various John Does, 499 F. Supp. 791, 791-92
(E.D. Wis. 1980) (relief granted). For a recent, thorough discussion of "John Doe"
seizure orders and their use against merchandise bootleggers, see generally Comment,
Rock Performers and the "John Doe" Temporary Restraining Order: Dressing Down the
T-Shirt Pirates, 16 J. MAR. L. REV. 101, 109-18 (1982).
66. See, e.g., Rock Tours, 507 F. Supp. at 64 (order would have authorized U.S. mar-
shals, state and local police, plaintiffs' counsel, and "any person acting under their su-
pervision" to carry out seizures); Concert Merchandising, supra note 9, at 61 (off-duty
policemen hired to carry out seizures on Rolling Stones tour). See also Zalon Affidavit
II, supra note 34, at 4-5 (citing cases). Zalon himself has been responsible for the con-
duct of over 100 seizure operations and claims that they are carried out "in a profes-
sional manner and without any untoward incident." Id. at 5.
67. See cases cited supra note 65. The need for the seizure of bootleg merchandise
is readily apparent. A temporary restraining order--even one obtained ex parte-is of
little value in such cases due to the inherent anonymity of the John Doe defendants,
who can violate such an order with virtual impunity. Once a concert is over, the dam-
age is done and the defendants are long gone. Zalon Affidavit II, supra note 34, at 3. As
one attorney put it, "People would come into town. They'd be served with papers.
They'd discard them, sell their merchandise and disappear into the night." Trademark
Attorneys, supra note 11, at 8 (quoting Peter A. Herbert, Esq.).
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prior to the date of the concert,68 and the plaintiff must post a
bond to secure the payment of costs and damages.69 A few
days after the concert, a hearing is held at which any defend-
ant found to have been wrongfully restrained may recover the
seized merchandise and any damages suffered.70 Not surpris-
ingly, the bootleg sellers almost invariably fail to appear at
these hearings.7'
Despite the extraordinary nature of the relief, the issuance
of John Doe seizure orders has become commonplace in mer-
chandise bootlegging cases. Winterland obtained its first such
order in September 1979,72 and since that time, it and other
merchandisers and performers have obtained identical relief
in hundreds of cases.73 Although most of the decisions are un-
68. See, e.g., Brockum Int'l Inc. 551 F. Supp. at 1055 (complaint filed six days before
concert); Geisel, 511 F. Supp. at 311-12 (complaint fied two days before concert); Rock
Tours, 507 F. Supp. at 64 (complaint fied eight days before concert). In Brockum Int'l,
Judge Evans expressed his displeasure with the short notice, complaining that he was
being asked "to literally drop what I am doing and give attention to this case .. " 551
F. Supp. at 1055. Although he granted the requested seizure order, he pointed out that
"we're only talking about selling a lot of mostly junk merchandise at grossly inflated
prices," and questioned whether, "on a hierarchy of priorities," the plaintiffs rights
were "that earthshaking... that they should not wait to be vindicated in a more or-
derly way." Id.
69. See Joel, 499 F. Supp. at 792. The required bond in such cases-including those
brought directly against printing houses-is normally $5,000 to $10,000. See, e.g., Order
to Show Cause on Motion for Preliminary Injunction with Temporary Restraining Or-
der and Order of Seizure [hereinafter Order to Show Cause], Brockum Int'l, Inc. v.
Great Am. Screen Design, Ltd., No. 82 Civ. 2948 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1982) ($10,000); Order
to Show Cause, Brockum Int'l, Inc. v. France, No. 82 Civ. 6210 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1982)
($5,000); Order to Show Cause, Bi-Rite Enters. v. Prism Products, Ltd., No. 81 Civ. 679
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1981) ($2,500 plus $10,000 receiver's bond). See also Trademark Attor-
neys, supra note 11, at 9 ($10,000 bond for Rolling Stones concert in Buffalo, New
York). The posting of a bond to cover potential damages is required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(c).
70. See Showtime Marketing, Inc. v. Doe, 95 F.R.D. 355, 356 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (dam-
ages sought). See also Geisel, 511 F. Supp. at 312; Joel, 499 F. Supp. at 792; Orders to
Show Cause cited supra note 69.
71. See Appleson, supra note 14. In Shaw v. Various John Does, No. 80 Civ. 722
(S.D.N.Y.), for example, a seizure action on behalf of the group Styx, some 38 peddlers
were served and over 800 shirts were seized. Zalon Affidavit II, supra note 34, at 3. Yet,
according to Jules Zalon, the attorney who brought the action, not one of the 38 ped-
dlers appeared at the hearing two days later. Id.; see also Winterland Concessions Co.
v. Smith, 706 F.2d 793, 794 (7th Cir. 1983) (of seventeen bootleg peddlers served, only
one appeared at hearing).
72. Appleson, supra note 14; Trademark Attorneys, supra note 11, at 8.
73. See, e.g., Brockum Int'l Inc., 551 F. Supp. 1054; Joel, 499 F. Supp. 791. See also
Rock Tours, 507 F. Supp. at 66 n.3 (citing sixteen cases); Zalon Affidavit II, supra note
34, at 3-5 (citing cases); Appleson, supra note 14 (more than 60 ex parte seizure orders
reportedly granted). According to Jules Zalon, more than 200 John Doe injunctions
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reported, the reasoning of the court in Joel v. Various John
Does ,74 an early reported case, is indicative of the rationale un-
derlying the issuance of such orders.
The court was troubled by the propriety of enjoining the ac-
tivities of persons whose identities were as yet unknown. It
believed that this problem was met, however, by the fact that
copies of the summons, complaint, and order would be served
on all persons from whom merchandise was seized. These in-
dividuals would be asked to reveal their names so that they
could be added as parties to the lawsuit. All parties would
be informed that whether or not they revealed their names
they could appear in court two days later to contest the
seizures. In addition, the plaintiffs were required to post a
bond to cover any damages that might be incurred.7 5 Realizing
that, absent such an order, the plaintiffs would be "without any
legal means to prevent what is clearly a blatant infringement of
their valid property rights," the court concluded: "[w] hile the
proposed remedy is novel, that in itself should not weigh
against its adoption by this court. A court of equity is free to
fashion whatever remedies will adequately protect the rights
of the parties before it."'76
Armed with Joel and other early decisions as precedent, at-
torneys representing artists and merchandisers became in-
creasingly successful in persuading federal judges throughout
the country to issue John Doe seizure orders.77 Brockum Inter-
national, Inc. v. Various John Does, 8 for example, involved a
requested seizure order for a Milwaukee concert by The Who.
Judge Evans, though punning that he did not at that time know
"who" the defendants in the case were,7 9 nevertheless agreed
to issue the order. He observed that the unknown defendant
and seizure orders have been granted over the past several years. Zalon Brief, supra
note 39, at 5.
74. 499 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
75. Id. at 792.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 73. Winterland attorney Michael Krassner reports that out of
the approximately 100 such cases'he took to court in 1980-81, he obtained the desired
relief 85% to 90% of the time. Trademark Attorneys, supra note 11, at 8. That figure is
probably even higher today. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussing
reason for high success rate).
78. 551 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
79. Id. at 1055. Despite his confessed preference for Chuck Berry, the Coasters,
and the Drifters, Judge Evans was familiar with The Who. Recalling the antics of local
disc jockey "rim the Rock 'n Roll Animal," who, from a 21st floor window ledge, gath-
ered 70,000 signatures on a petition asking The Who to come to Milwaukee, Judge Ev-
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problem had "not been an impediment" to the issuance of such
an order in Joel, a case which had arisen two years earlier in
the same district.8 0
The existence of such precedent has not been sufficient to
sway all judges, however. In Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Does,81 for in-
stance, the court refused to issue a John Doe seizure order cov-
ering a Styx concert in Birmingham, Alabama because, in the
court's view, the action was not at that time "a justiciable one
for purposes of ex parte injunctive relief."82  Although the
court cited sixteen cases in which the lack of known defend-
ants had not posed an "insurmountable barrier" to preliminary
injunctive relief, it declared that "this Court is not so sanguine
in an ex parte proceeding."83 Fearing that it might lack in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the unnamed, itinerant defendants,
the court determined that the case lacked the existence of a
"sufficient adversary interest" and denied relief. 4
Although the court noted that the plaintiffs were "free ... to
amend their complaint to add specific individuals and/or orga-
nizations as [defendants,] 8 5 this solution proved futile in a
similar case, Winterland Concessions Co. v. Geisel. 6 In Geisel,
ans admitted that "[wle haven't had that kind of excitement in Milwaukee since
Brigadoon last played at the Melody Top Theater." Id. at 1055 n.*.
80. Id. at 1055. Although he granted a seizure order covering the Milwaukee con-
cert, Judge Evans "decline[ d] the invitation of the plaintiff to issue an order prohibit-
ing the same activity in other cities visited by The Who on its national tour," believing
that such an order would be "inappropriate." Id. at 1055-56. Nevertheless, according to
Jules Zalon, the plaintiff's attorney in Brockum Int'l, nationwide TROs covering an
entire series of concerts have been granted by district court judges on numerous occa-
sions. Zalon Affidavit II, supra note 34, at 4-5 (citing twelve cases). Undoubtedly, such
orders considerably reduce the expense involved in bringing repeated lawsuits across
the country. At the same time, however, they may raise serious due process concerns.
Although the constitutional validity of individual John Doe seizure orders apparently
has not been questioned by an appellate court, to clothe such orders with nationwide
effect may be to stretch the due process clause a trifle far. For a discussion and analy-
sis of the legal and constitutional bases for ex parte injunctive relief, see Rakoff, supra
note 17, at 216-24.
81. 507 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
82. Id. at 66.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court suggested that the problem could be addressed more appropri-
ately by the legislative or executive branches of government. It pointed out, in that
regard, that the plaintiffs' interests already were protected sufficiently by a municipal
ordinance that essentially prohibited the sale of unauthorized merchandise outside
the Birmingham Civic Center, the arena at which Styx was scheduled to appear. Id. at
65-66.
85. Id. at 66 n.5.
86. 511 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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the court initially denied the plaintiffs' request for a seizure
order covering an REO Speedwagon concert at the Chicago
Amphitheatre because "absent the designation of any specific
defendants and given the claim that presently unknown per-
sons would engage in future violations of plaintiffs' rights,
there was no 'case' or 'controversy' within the meaning of Arti-
cle HI of the United States Constitution."87 As in Rock Tours,
the court informed the plaintiffs that if they amended their
complaint to name one or more specific defendants, it would be
willing to issue a TRO and seizure order as to those
defendants.88
Early on the evening of the concert, the plaintiffs' counsel
telephoned the judge and advised him that Don Horowitz and
Earl Goldberg were selling unauthorized t-shirts near the
Amphitheatre. Pursuant to their oral motion, Judge Shadur al-
lowed the plaintiffs to amend the complaint to designate
Horowitz and Goldberg as defendants and he issued the TRO
and seizure order.89 Later in the evening, U.S. marshals seized
a large quantity of t-shirts from Robert Geisel and two other
individuals. About a half hour later, the plaintiffs' counsel
again telephoned the judge and added Geisel as a party
defendant.90
At the post-concert evidentiary hearing two days later, Gei-
sel and his companions, represented by counsel, contested the
seizure of their shirts. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(d) which governs the scope of injunctions and restraining
orders, a TRO is binding only upon the parties, their respective
officers and agents, and those persons in "active concert or par-
ticipation" with them, who received actual notice of the order
by personal service or otherwise. 91 Because Geisel was not ad-
ded as a defendant until a half hour after the seizure took
place, he was not at the time of the seizure a party to the suit.
Thus, in order to uphold the seizure as valid, the plaintiffs were
required to prove that Geisel was somehow in "active concert
87. Id. at 311 (emphasis in original). Accord, Showtime Marketing, Inc. v. Doe, 95
F.R.D. 355, 356 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
88. 511 F. Supp. at 311.
89. Id. at 312.
90. Id. In fact, Robert had given his father's name, Thomas Geisel, to the marshals
when they seized his shirts. It was the elder Geisel who was added as a party to the
suit, even though he had not attended the concert. Id. at 312 n.3. This misidentifica-
tion, however, apparently had no bearing on the court's determination.
91. Id. at 311 n.2; see FED. R. Crv. P. 65(d).
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or participation" with Horowitz or Goldberg, the only named
defendants at the time of the seizure. Based on the evidence
adduced at the hearing, the court determined that the plaintiffs
failed in their proof and ordered the return of the shirts.92 De-
spite the fact that Geisel was caught at the concert with a sub-
stantial supply of bootleg shirts, he was allowed to walk out of
the hearing with his stock fully intact.
Requests for John Doe seizure orders that would have effect
outside the immediate vicinity of a concert are likely to be
viewed with even less favor. Aside from the difficulty of prov-
ing source confusion, a necessary element under the legal the-
ory upon which many such orders are obtained,93 seizure
requests, if not sufficiently restricted in duration and geo-
graphic scope, may easily be rejected on grounds of adminis-
trative inconvenience and potential public disruption.
Although no reported case has posed this issue in the context
of music-related merchandise, the applicable reasoning was
vividly articulated in the recent case of National Football
League Properties, Inc. v. Coniglio.94 In that case, filed during
the height of Super Bowl fever in Washington, D.C., the plain-
tiff sought an ex parte TRO and seizure order against three
named defendants as well as any as yet unknown defendants
(designated as "Various John Does and Jane Does and ABC
Companies") enjoining the sale of unlicensed NFL souvenir
merchandise throughout the District of Columbia.95
In refusing to issue a TRO or seizure order, the court deter-
mined that the potential harm to the defendants and the gen-
eral public far outweighed any injury the plaintiff would suffer
in the absence of such orders.96 Although the court claimed
92. 511 F. Supp. at 312. See also Showtime Marketing, 95 F.R.D. at 356 (shirts or-
dered returned).
93. See infra notes 130-53 and accompanying text (discussing source confusion re-
quirement under trademark laws).
94. 554 F. Supp. 1224 (D.D.C. 1983).
95. Id. at 1225. Judge Richey, in a tone that betrayed his view of the merits of the
case, described the relief sought by the plaintiff as:
[Aln order from this Court authorizing the United States Marshall [sic] or any
duly-authorized security representative of plaintiff to traverse the streets of
Washington and to physically seize and impound any such merchandise man-
ufactured, distributed, advertised, offered for sale, or sold in the District, and
to hold the seized goods in the custody of plaintiff's counsel for ultimate pres-
entation, by the bagload, to the chambers of this Court.
Id.
96. Id. at 1226. Judge Richey purported to measure the plaintiff's request by the
"well-established standards for preliminary injunctive relief": (1) likelihood of suc-
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that the requested relief "would open a veritable Pandora's
box of problems that this Court cannot even begin to imagine
now," it managed to conjure up a fairly substantial parade of
horrors which it described in no uncertain terms:
[T] he order requested by plaintiff would appear to invite catas-
trophe. It promises a nightmare of jurisdictional flaws, depri-
vations of due process, and windfall litigation that could ensue
for years to come. This is not even to mention the physical
spectacle of the United States Marshall [sic] Service, which is
already overburdened in its work, in the company of paid thugs
(euphemistically styled "security representatives") roaming
the streets of Washington to confiscate the merchandise of
small businessmen and other licensed vendors who sell their
cess on the merits; (2) threat of irreparable injury to the plaintiff if no injunction is
issued; (3) the degree of harm an injunction would cause to the defendant and other
interested parties; and (4) the public interest. Id. at 1225. But while he amply demon-
strated the potential for harm to the defendants and the general public, his reasoning
with regard to the first two factors is less persuasive. As to the first, Judge Richey
professed that it would be impossible for the plaintiff to demonstrate a likelihood of
prevailing against defendants whom it had not yet named. Id. at 1226. This, however,
is far from certain. Although it may not have done so in this case, it would not seem to
be particularly difficult for the NFL to document the existence of numerous unidenti-
fled persons selling clearly infringing merchandise on the streets of Washington. As-
suming the marshals or their assistants are able to distinguish authorized from
unauthorized merchandise and seize only the latter, there is no reason to presume that
an infringement claim would be unlikely to succeed in such circumstances simply be-
cause the seller is as yet unidentified. Certainly in the case of bootleg t-shirt sales at
concerts, where only unauthorized merchandise is sold outside the arena, such a pre-
sumption would not hold true.
As to the second factor, irreparable injury, Judge Richey found the plaintiff's need
for a TRO less than compelling by virtue of the plaintiff's admission that "once notice
of the lawsuit is given to one infringer, word will spread immediately to others, who
will thereupon disappear, and merchandise will be concealed, shipments will be
halted, and goods will be transported out of the jurisdiction." Id. In Judge Richey's
view, this was precisely the result that the plaintiff was seeking through the issuance
of a TRO, and it could be accomplished "merely by service of a complaint." Id. Given
the limited territorial jurisdiction of a federal district court, Judge Richey may be tech-
nically correct, but his analysis avoids the obvious realities of the situation. Surely the
NFL sought to do more than simply drive the bootleggers temporarily out of the Dis-
trict to peddle their wares in the Virginia and Maryland suburbs, returning, perhaps,
when all of the complaints were served. Some bootleggers no doubt simply would con-
ceal their illicit merchandise and continue selling it on the sly. The superiority of the
relief obtainable through the issuance of a seizure order-both in terms of deterrence
and the actual confiscation of infringing merchandise-is obvious. It would be disin-
genuous to suggest that the NFL did not realize as much.
Of course, in the context of concert site bootlegging, Judge Richey's analysis as to
irreparable injury is totally inapplicable. Given the limited duration of a concert, the
service of a mere complaint on a bootlegger is of little avail since, by the time the
peddler "disappears" after the concert, the damage is already done. See supra note 67
(discussing need for seizure orders at concert sites).
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wares in the open air.9 7
Concluding that "[s ] urely plaintiff must jest when it contends
that all of this would be a 'minimal inconvenience' . . . ," the
court denied the TRO and ordered that a hearing on the re-
quested preliminary injunction would be held only after serv-
ice was effected on all defendants and their responsive
pleadings were submitted.98
Despite the potential impediments of justiciability and pub-
lic disruption, artists and merchandisers today are able to ob-
tain John Doe seizure orders covering individual concerts
fairly routinely. In 1981, one attorney estimated that he had
successfully obtained such relief in eighty-five to ninety per-
cent of the cases he had brought in the preceding two years.99
Today, the success rate is probably even higher. Because so
many of these actions have been brought over the past three or
four years,100 they no longer appear novel and extraordinary to
federal district court judges. In fact, one well-known entertain-
ment litigator confides that all he has to do when such a case
comes into his office is pull a standard form from his file, fill in
the appropriate names, and carry it down to the courthouse,
along with a copy of the last such order issued by the judge
who will be hearing the case.' 10
B. Battling the Bootleggers: Enforcement at the Source
Their ready availability notwithstanding, pre-concert John
Doe seizure orders are of only limited utility in combatting the
bootleg problem. While such orders reduce bootlegging activ-
ity at concert sites to an extent, 1 2 the large number of peddlers
at each show and the small number of t-shirts they carry with
them ensure that the bootlegging business goes on as usual.
Moreover, the cost of obtaining seizure orders in city after city
throughout a concert tour can be prohibitive. For the Rolling
Stones' twelve-week 1981 tour, their licensed merchandiser,
Winterland Concessions, spent what Winterland president
97. 554 F. Supp. at 1225.
98. Id. at 1226. In New Orleans two years earlier, the NFL succeeded in obtaining
an injunction prohibiting the sale of unauthorized Super Bowl merchandise. Because
the seller was an established local retailer, however, the judge, like Judge Richey,
deemed a seizure unnecessary. Trademark Attorneys, supra note 11, at 8.
99. See supra note 77.
100. See supra note 73.
101. Conversation with Peter A. Herbert, Esq., in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 1983).
102. See supra note 57.
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Dell Furano termed "an extraordinary amount of money" to
cut down on bootlegging." 3 Deploying a nation-wide task force
of lawyers, Winterland obtained John Doe seizure orders in
every city along the tour and hired as many as fifty off-duty
police officers in each city to carry out the seizures. 0 4 Few
other bands could afford such an ambitious "legal blitz." In-
deed, for many bands who spend upwards of half a year on the
road,105 the costs of such an effort would likely outweigh its
returns.
Recognizing the inadequacy of seizure orders, artists and
merchandisers in recent years have begun turning their atten-
tion toward the printers that manufacture bootleg goods.
Winterland, for instance, has hired private investigators to trail
bootleggers and to try to determine the nature of their organi-
zation. Using this information, Winterland has filed a number
of lawsuits against printing houses, hoping to "cut the problem
off at its source. 10 6 Despite a few notable victories, however,
little success has been achieved. To date, monetary recoveries
have been obtained in only a handful of reported cases.
In one of the earliest cases, Musidor, B. V. v. Great American
Screen,1°7 brought in 1978 on behalf of the Rolling Stones, the
corporate and individual defendants ultimately received crimi-
nal contempt citations of $10,000 and sixty days in jail, respec-
tively, for violating a preliminary injunction. 08 The contempt
charges were prosecuted by the plaintiff's attorney, Peter Her-
103. Concert Merchandising, supra note 9, at 61.
104. Id. See generally Trademark Attorneys, supra note 11.
105. Nor is lengthy touring restricted to less-known performers. On September 14,
1981, the same day the Rolling Stones kicked off their twelve-week American tour,
Bruce Springsteen, one of rock's most popular performers, played the last of 139 per-
formances on a mammoth American and European tour. The tour, which followed on
the heels of Springsteen's million selling album, The River, commenced in October
1980 in Ann Arbor, Michigan and criss-crossed the continent twice before coming to a
temporary halt in early March 1981. After a short break, the tour hit Europe for two
months, returning to the States in early July for a final cross country swing. In all,
Springsteen and his band were on the road for eleven and a half months and played to
more than a million people.
Springsteen is in fact no stranger to long roadtrips. His previous tour in 1978 lasted
seven months and included 109 shows in 86 American cities. See generally D. MARSH,
BORN TO RUN: THE BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN STORY 292-95 (1981) (chronicling Springsteen's
live performances); Springsteen Wraps Up Tour, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 29, 1981, at 40.
106. T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9. See also Bootleggers, supra note 12 (merchandis-
ers bringing suits against printers).
107. 658 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982).
108. Id. at 63. Contempt charges against Great American arising out of the violation
of a second injunction, involving "Grateful Dead" and "Fleetwood Mac" t-shirts, were
No. 11
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 6
bert,109 who, through the testimony of a former employee of
Great American,11 was able to establish that the company had
continued to print Rolling Stones t-shirts after the issuance of
the injunction by hiding silk screens in a basement and using
nightshifts to do the printing."' The penalties were affirmed
by the Second Circuit on appeal." 2
The largest reported recovery occurred in 1981 when a fed-
eral district judge awarded Winterland Concessions almost $1
million in trebled damages and attorney's fees from a large-
scale bootleg t-shirt printer based in Chicago.1 3 In Winterland
Concessions Co. v. Creative Screen Design, Ltd., Winterland
was able to establish its damages by introducing coded sales
records covering a fifteen-month period that a Winterland in-
vestigator had found among the trash discarded by Creative. 1 4
Using these invoices and Winterland's own business records,
the court calculated the amount of Creative's infringing sales
and the approximate loss to Winterland resulting from each
such sale. The court determined that Winterland had lost
$275,204 in profits which, when trebled,1 5 came to $825,612.16
After adding the defendants' profits of $62,603 and $77,140 in at-
prosecuted simultaneously with the Rolling Stones action and resulted in the imposi-
tion of a concurrent fine of $10,000. Id. at 62-63.
109. When it appeared that the defendants were violating the preliminary injunc-
tions against dealing in any goods bearing the trademarks of the musical groups in-
volved, the plaintiffs sought an order under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b)
directing the United States Attorney or appointing a special attorney to prosecute
charges of criminal contempt. The law firm of Parcher & Herbert, which represented
the plaintiffs in both actions, was appointed special attorney to prosecute the charges.
Id. at 62.
110. In the Grateful Dead/Fleetwood Mac case, the evidence was based largely on
the testimony of a private investigator who had conducted surveillance at the premises
of Great American. Id. at 63.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 66.
113. See Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. 188. Liability was determined in an
earlier proceeding, reported at 210 U.S.P.Q. 6 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
114. Creative Screen Design, 210 U.S.P.Q. at 9.
115. Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 191. The Lanham Act, one of the
grounds upon which the suit was brought, authorizes the trebling of damages in the
court's discretion. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976)).
116. Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 189-91. The court refused to find that
each infringing sale by Creative deprived Winterland of the sale of a licensed shirt. Id.
at 190. The court reasoned that some individuals, who would not have wished to
purchase the higher priced licensed shirts in any event, would purchase the lower
priced bootleg shirts. It thus determined that, at a minimum, every two bootleg sales
cost Winterland one sale, and calculated damages on the basis of this 2:1 ratio. Id.
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torney's fees, Winterland's total award was $965,355.117
Finally, a merchandiser in one recent case was found to be
entitled to damages and injunctive relief against the manufac-
turers and distributors of unauthorized buttons bearing the
names and likenesses of the plaintiff's licensors." 8
III
T-Shirts, Trademarks, and Torts: The Bases
of Relief
In their efforts to halt bootlegging activity, artists and mer-
chandisers have proceeded under a variety of legal theories,
both statutory and common law. They have brought actions in
state and federal courts alleging, among other things, unfair
competition, trademark infringement, trademark dilution, false
designation of origin, copyright infringement, and misappropri-
ation of the right of publicity. 9 Of these, section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act' 2°-a part of the broader law of unfair competition
specifically aimed at false designations of origin-and the com-
mon law right of publicity have emerged as the most promising
avenues of relief against merchandise bootleggers.
A. False Designation of Origin
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connec-
tion with any goods or services, or any container or containers
for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description
or representation, including words or other symbols tending
falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such
goods or services to enter into commerce ... shall be liable to
a civil action ... by any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or
representation. 12 1
117. See id. at 191. The court also awarded Winterland its costs. Id. The award was
entered against Arnold and Allan Goldzweig, the president and secretary-treasurer of
Creative, respectively. No damages were assessed against Creative itself, which en-
tered Chapter VII bankruptcy shortly before the trial on damages was held. Id. at 188-
89.
118. See Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See
generally infra notes 145-53 & 168-74 and accompanying text (discussing Button
Master).
119. See Grimes, supra note 12, at 448.
120. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
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Most popular musical groups and artists have valid common
law trademarks or service marks in their names, 122 but few ap-
parently have federally registered marks.123 As such, they are
not protected by the general infringement provisions of the
122. For a lucid and eminently readable discussion of the requirements for the ac-
quisition and protection of trademarks and service marks, see E. KINTNER & J. LAHR,
AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 245-337 (2d ed. 1982).
123. See, e.g., Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 191; Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1214.
The plaintiffs in Sileo and Creative Screen Design included the Rolling Stones, REO
Speedwagon, Fleetwood Mac, the Doobie Brothers, the Jefferson Starship, Tom Petty
& the Heartbreakers, Bob Seger, Aerosmith, and Bruce Springsteen, none of whose
marks were federally registered. The reason for this is not readily apparent. The af-
fairs of most major artists are handled by sophisticated lawyers and business agents,
and many operate under a corporate form, e.g. Raindrop Products, Inc. (Rolling
Stones); 2001 Whitecastle Way, Ltd. (Pat Benatar); Jefferson Starship, Inc. (Jefferson
Starship); Nightmare Productions, Inc. (Journey); SBB, Inc. (Bob Seger); Music Mak-
ers, Inc. (Doobie Brothers). Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1204-05. It would not appear to be
prohibitively difficult or expensive for such artists to secure trademark registration.
"GRATEFUL DEAD," for example, is a federally registered service mark for public
musical performances. Grimes, supra note 12, at 440 & n.37. Similarly, the name
"JOHNNY CARSON" is a federally registered service mark for comedy performances,
and "JETS" is a federally registered service mark for football exhibitions. Id. at 440 &
nn.36 & 39. See generally Fowler, When Are Surnames Registrable? 70 TRADE-MARK
REP. 66 (1980); Gottlieb, The Right ofan Individual to Register His Own Name for Serv-
ices He Personally Performs, 68 TRADE-MARK REP. 596 (1978).
A potential problem exists in attempting to register such marks for use on collateral
merchandising properties, such as t-shirts. Registration will be refused if the mark
serves merely a decorative or ornamental purpose and does not denote the source of
the product. Grimes, supra at 440-41. The Patent and Trademark Office, however, has
recognized that a word or device, in addition to ornamenting a product, may also ad-
vise purchasers of its source or origin. Id. In the leading case of In re Olin Corp., 181
U.S.P.Q. 182 (T.T.A.B. 1973), the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ruled that the cor-
porate symbol of the Olin Corporation was registrable for use on t-shirts. In so hold-
ing, the Board observed that:
It is a matter of common knowledge that T-shirts are "ornamented" with
various insignia, including college insignias, or "ornamented" with various
sayings .... If such ornamentation is without any meaning other than as
mere ornamentation it is apparent that the ornamentation could not and
would not serve as indicia of source....
The "ornamentation" of a T-shirt can be of a special nature which inherently
tells the purchasing public the source of the T-shirt, not the source of manu-
facture but the secondary source. Thus, the name "New York University"...
albeit it will serve as ornamentation on a T-shirt will also advise the purchaser
that the university is the secondary source of that shirt .... Where the shirt
is distributed by other than the university the university's name on the shirt
will indicate the sponsorship or authorization by the university.
Id. at 182. See Winner, supra note 16 (arguing for protection of "fad" merchandising
value of trademark's "persona"); see also infra notes 130-53 and accompanying text
(discussing requirement of source or sponsorship confusion for trademark infringe-
ment action).
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Lanham Act.124 Under section 43(a), however, registration is
not a prerequisite to recovery.125 Intent is also not a necessary
element.'26 Although the section was at one time restricted
largely to classic "passing off" situations, it has emerged today
as a federal remedy against virtually any deceptive use of an
unregistered trademark. 127 The test under section 43(a) is, for
all practical purposes, the same as that for infringement of a
registered trademark. 28 Moreover, a successful litigant under
section 43(a) is entitled to the full panoply of remedies avail-
able under the Lanham Act, including possible treble damages,
the recovery of attorney's fees, and the seizure and destruction
of infringing goods.
129
Still, a potentially fatal stumbling block lies in the path of an
artist or merchandiser bringing an action under section 43(a).
In order to prevail under this section, as in a trademark in-
fringement action, a plaintiff must establish, among other
things, that the defendant's actions are likely to confuse the
public as to the origin or sponsorship of the goods in issue. 30
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976) (infringement of registered trademark).
125. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004,
1010 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); National Football League Properties,
Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 657 (W.D. Wash. 1982); Creative
Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 191; Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1214; Germain, Unfair Trade
Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: You've Come a Long Way, Baby-
Too Far, Maybe? 64 TRADE-MARK REP. 193, 211 (1974).
126. Germain, supra note 125, at 213. See generally id. at 205-09 (discussing ele-
ments of § 43(a) action).
127. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Germain, supra note 125, at 193-97.
128. Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676
F.2d 1079, 1086 (5th Cir. 1982); International Order of Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 917;
American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 664 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, 510 F.2d at 1009-10; But-
ton Master, 555 F. Supp. at 1192-93; Wichita Falls, 532 F. Supp. at 657.
129. See, e.g., Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 191; Germain, supra note 125,
at 213-14. But see id. at 221-24 (arguing that remedies of Lanham Act should not be
applied to violations of § 43(a) simpliciter).
130. Supreme Assembly, 676 F.2d at 1082 & n.3; International Order of Job's Daugh-
ters, 633 F.2d at 917; American Footwear Corp., 609 F.2d at 664; Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F,2d 200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1979); Boston
Professional Hockey Ass'n, 510 F.2d at 1009-10; Button Master., 555 F. Supp. at 1194;
Wichita Falls, 532 F. Supp. at 657. Prior to 1962, a plaintiff in a trademark infringement
action was required to prove that the defendant's use of the mark would be likely "to
deceive purchasers as to the source or origin of such goods or services." Supreme As-
sembly, 676 F.2d at 1082 n.3. In 1962, however, Congress amended the Lanham Act to
delete this "source or origin" language. Id.; Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1010. Today, it
is well established that the confusion requirement is satisfied by "[t] he public's belief
that the mark's owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark. .. "
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Thus, if the feature appropriated by the defendant serves a
solely functional or decorative purpose rather than a source-
denoting purpose, there is no confusion and the defendant's
actions are not prosecutable under the statute.1
31
In the context of music-related merchandise, at least one
court has viewed the display of an artist's name or likeness on
a button as primarily functional rather than source-denoting
and thus not actionable under section 43(a). 132 In similar cir-
cumstances, however, another court reached a different con-
clusion. In Boston Professional Hockey Association v. Dallas
Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc.,113  the Fifth Circuit
finessed the source-confusion problem by focusing on the de-
fendant's intentional capitalization on the commercial value of
the plaintiffs' trademark. 3
4
In Boston Hockey, Dallas Cap, without authorization from
the National Hockey League, manufactured and sold to the
public embroidered cloth emblems bearing the symbols and
trademarks of the NHL teams. 35 The district court found that
the use of the teams' symbols was a functional use, not a trade-
mark use, and that there was no likelihood of confusion as to
the source of the emblems. The typical purchaser, even
though recognizing the trademark as that of the member team,
would have no reason to believe that the emblems were manu-
factured by or had some connection with the team or the
Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 205. See, e.g., Wichita Falls, 532 F. Supp. at 659 (creation of
confusion as to sponsorship also actionable); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp.
1339, 1371 (D.N.J. 1981) (sufficient if public believes mark related to, associated with, or
sponsored by plaintiff). See generally 48 TENN. L. REV. 182, 185 & n.ll (1980) (discuss-
ing extension of sponsorship test in Dallas Cowboys).
131. Supreme Assembly, 676 F.2d at 1083 n.5; International Order of Job's Daughters,
633 F.2d at 917; Button Master, 555 F. Supp. at 1195; Wichita Falls, 532 F. Supp. at 662;
Damn I'm Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). A feature
is functional "if it connotes other than a trademark purpose, that is, if it is an important
ingredient in the commercial success of the product." Id. Thus, the functional fea-
tures of a product "constitute the actual benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase,
as distinguished from an assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored, or en-
dorsed a product." Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 917. Such features may be freely cop-
ied. Id.; see also Button Master, 555 F. Supp. at 1195 (functionality means consumers
desire mark for intrinsic value, not as designation of origin). Of course, a feature can
simultaneously be functional and source-denoting. As long as a feature or mark is not
solely functional, it may be protected under trademark laws. See infra notes 152-53
and accompanying text.
132. See Button Master, 555 F. Supp. at 1195-96.
133. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
134. Id. at 1011-12.
135. Id. at 1008-09.
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NHL. 136 The Fifth Circuit, however, found this knowledge on
the part of the buyer sufficient to meet the statute's confusion
requirement. The court held:
The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that the
defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them
to the public knowing that the public would identify them as
being the teams' trademarks. The certain knowledge of the
buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols
were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act. The argu-
ment that confusion must be as to the source of the emblem
itself is unpersuasive, where the trademark, originated by the
team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the
emblem.
137
Although the court acknowledged that its decision "may
slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose of protecting
the public to the protection of the business interests of plain-
tiffs,"' 38 few other courts have been willing to sanction such a
"tilt," and the decision has been roundly criticized. 39 In Inter-
national Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co. ,"4 for ex-
ample, the Ninth Circuit described the "tilt" in Boston Hockey
as "not slight, but an extraordinary extension of the protection
heretofore afforded trademark owners. It is an extension we
cannot endorse.''
It seems unlikely that any court today would follow Boston
136. Boston Hockey, 360 F. Supp. 459, 463-64 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
137. 510 F.2d at 1012. The court also rejected the defendant's functionality argu-
ment, reasoning that the embroidered symbols sold not because of their aesthetic
characteristics, "but because they are the trademarks of the hockey teams." Id. at
1013.
138. Id. at 1011.
139. But see Presta, The Boston Professional Hockey Association Case and Related
Cases--A Step in the Right Direction, 66 TRADE-MARK REP. 131 (1976) (supporting Bos-
ton Hockey decision).
140. 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981).
141. Id. at 919. The court observed that:
It is not uncommon for a name or emblem that serves in one context as a
collective mark or trademark also to be merchandised for its own intrinsic util-
ity to consumers. We commonly identify ourselves by displaying emblems ex-
pressing allegiances. Our jewelry, clothing, and cars are emblazoned with
inscriptions showing the organizations we belong to, the schools we attend,
the landmarks we have visited, the sports teams we support, the beverages we
imbibe. Although these inscriptions frequently include names and emblems
that are also used as collective marks or trademarks, it would be naive to con-
clude that the name or emblem is desired because consumers believe that the
product somehow originated with or was sponsored by the organization the




Hockey, and even the Fifth Circuit recently retreated some-
what from the broad language of that case, noting that knowl-
edge of a symbol's source would not always constitute
confusion sufficient to establish trademark infringement.'42
The pertinent question, the court continued, is "whether in a
given case knowledge of the source of the symbol supports the
inference that many of the product's typical purchasers would
believe that the product itself originated with or was somehow
endorsed by the owner of the mark."'143 Thus, under the pre-
vailing view of the Lanham Act, and unfair competition law
generally, "one can capitalize on a market or fad created by
another provided that it is not accomplished by confusing the
public into mistakenly purchasing the product in the belief
that the product is the product of the competitor."'4
For musical artists and merchandisers, the potential prob-
lem with the source/sponsorship confusion requirement of
section 43(a) is well illustrated by the recent case of Bi-Rite
Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master. 45 Bi-Rite, a licensed manu-
facturer and distributor of buttons, patches, bumper stickers,
and other novelty items, along with several of its licensors,
sought relief under section 43(a) against several unlicensed
manufacturers of buttons bearing, among other things, the
common law marks of Bi-Rite's licensors. 4 6 In rejecting this
claim, the court distinguished patent and copyright laws,
which "grant to the creators of original expressions and ideas
monopoly power over their use and sale," from trademark
laws, which function "to protect the individual reputation and
good-will that parties build for their goods in the market."' 47
The court observed that while the desire "to protect the full
economic value of distinctive marks" is understandable, it
1
142. See Supreme Assembly, 676 F.2d at 1085.
143. Id. The court explained that confusion would not be established by showing
that typical buyers purchase the items because of the presence of the mark. Rather,
"it must be shown that they would purchase the items because the presence of the
mark indicates to them the necessary connection between the items themselves and
the owner of the mark." Id. at 1084 n.7.
144. American Footwear Corp., 609 F.2d at 662.
145. 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
146. Id. at 1191. Bi-Rite also alleged violations of New York state and common law
trademark and unfair competition laws, New York's anti-dilution and right to privacy
statutes, and the common law right of publicity. Id. at 1191-92. It was joined in the
suit by several of its licensors, including Pat Benatar, Neil Young, Judas Priest, Molly
Hatchet, Devo, Styx, and Iron Maiden.
147. Id. at 1194.
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"cannot negate the fact that unfair competition law clearly re-
quires confusion as to the source of goods before it will protect
the unauthorized use of a mark."'48
With this in mind, the court rejected Boston Hockey, 49 point-
ing out that "[iIn this circuit [the Second Circuit], marks that
are exploited only for their functional value and not to confuse
the public receive no protection under unfair competition laws.
Functionality in this context means that consumers desire the
mark for its intrinsic value and not as a designation of ori-
gin." 150 Finding no evidence of confusion as to either source or
sponsorship, the court denied the plaintiffs' section 43(a)
claim.'15
Of course, a mark can serve both functional and source-de-
noting purposes simultaneously. The law of unfair competi-
tion requires only that functionality not be the mark's sole
value.12  It may be that outside a concert hall, a performer's
name emblazoned on a t-shirt would be sufficiently source or
sponsorship denoting to be protectable under section 43(a).
As the Bi-Rite court observed, "[i]n certain contexts, such as
at concerts where the mark's owner performs, the public may,
in fact, assume that the owner of the mark sponsored or even
produced the goods--emblems, buttons or T-shirts-that bear
its mark.'151
In practice, section 43(a) claims have been consistently suc-
cessful against bootleggers both at concert sites and away from
them. 4 In view of the present direction of the case-law, how-
ever, the continued utility of section 43(a) as a legal weapon
against merchandise bootlegging is questionable.
148. Id.
149. The court also criticized, among other cases, Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, and Joel,
499 F. Supp. 791, decisions which, in its view, "dispense [d] even with the pretense of an
analytic effort to extend trademark relief." Button Master, 555 F. Supp. at 1194.
150. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. at 1195.
151. Id. at 1196. The court did, however, grant the plaintiffs injunctive and mone-
tary relief on their right on publicity claims. Id. at 1201. See infra notes 168-74 and
accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 919; Dallas Cow-
boys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 204 ("the fact that an item serves or performs a function
does not mean that it may not at the same time be capable of indicating sponsorship or
origin, particularly where the decorative aspects of the item are nonfunctional"); Wich-
ita Falls, 532 F. Supp. at 663; National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer
Enter., 26 Ill. App. 3d 814, 327 N.E.2d 242, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
153. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. at 1195-96.
154. See, e.g., Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 191 (printing house); Sileo, 528
F. Supp. at 1214 (printing house); Joel, 499 F. Supp. at 792 (concert site).
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B. The Right of Publicity
Probably the most certain basis of relief against merchan-
dise bootlegging lies in the performer's common law "right of
publicity." '155 This still evolving concept has been described as
an individual's right to "own, protect and commercially exploit
his own name, likeness, and identity. ' 156 The right of publicity
grants to an artist exclusive control over the "commercial value
of his name and likeness and . . . prevent[s] others from ex-
ploiting that value without permission."157 In essence, it is a
theory of protection for an individual's "persona." ' 8
Although the right of publicity has received wide recogni-
tion, 5 9 its exact contours remain somewhat unclear. The doc-
trine evolved from the personal right of privacy and first
emerged as a distinct, transferable property right in Judge
Frank's 1953 opinion in Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc.160 Courts continued to confuse the rights
of privacy and publicity, however, until 1977 when the Supreme
Court, in Zachinni v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. ,161 dis-
tinguished the two torts, recognizing the latter as a "discrete
kind of 'appropriation'" involving an individual's "proprietary
interest."'16 2
155. A detailed discussion of the right of publicity is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. For comprehensive analysis of the doctrine, its history, and its scope, see generally
Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 Bum, COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 111 (1980);
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954); Phillips, A Hay-
stack in a Hurricane: Divergent Case Law on the Right of Publicity and the Copyright
Act of 1976, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 296 (1981); Pilpel, The Right of Publicity, 27 BuLL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 249 (1980); Rader, The "Right of Publicity"--A New Dimension, 61 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 228 (1979).
156. Rader, supra note 155, at 228. See also Hoffman, supra note 155, at 112 (right of
publicity protects person's name, likeness, achievements and characteristics).
157. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. at 1198.
158. Winner, supra note 16, at 197.
159. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 n.6 (D.N.J. 1981) and
cases cited therein. See also articles cited supra note 155. But see Rock Tours, 507 F.
Supp. at 66 n.6 (existence of cause of action for misappropriation of right of publicity
under Alabama common law open to question).
160. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). See Phillips, supra note
155, at 296-301 (discussing genesis of right of publicity); Rader, supra note 155, at 228-32
(same).
161. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
162. Id. at 572-73. The right of privacy is essentially the right to be left alone and it
is intended to protect individual personality and feelings. The right of publicity is con-
ceptually different. One asserting such a right does not wish to be left alone, but
wishes to control the manner in which his "persona" will be commercially exploited.
The right of publicity is intended to protect the commercial "property" value acquired
by names and likenesses due to investments of time, energy, money, and talent. But-
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Despite recognition by the Supreme Court, the right of pub-
licity remains in a state of flux today.163 Many aspects of the
doctrine are still unsettled,16 and the courts are particularly
split as to whether the right survives the death of its holder. 65
The right also may conflict with the first amendment. 66 Never-
theless, there appears to be little doubt that, whatever its con-
ton Master, 555 F. Supp. at 1198. See generally Phillips, supra note 155, at 299-304 (com-
paring rights of privacy and publicity); Pilpel, supra note 155, at 250-55 (same); Rader,
supra note 155, at 228-38 (same).
163. Phillips, supra note 155, at 297.
164. In a lecture delivered in late 1979, Harriet Pilpel discussed five major questions
concerning the right of publicity that had yet to be resolved: (1) Does everyone have a
right of publicity, or just individuals who have established a public personality?
(2) Must the right be exploited during the individual's lifetime? (3) What are commer-
cial purposes? (4) Does the right attach only to an individual's real name, or does it
also protect nicknames? (5) What is the duration of the right? Pilpel, supra note 155, at
255-59.
165. The majority view appears to be that the right of publicity is a descendible
right, surviving the death of the holder. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579
F.2d 215, 220-21 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415
F.2d 1205, 1206 (8th Cir. 1969); Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1355; Hicks v. Casa-
blanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Uhlaender v. Hendricksen, 316 F. Supp.
1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970). However, there is authority to the contrary. See, e.g., Fac-
tors Etc., 652 F.2d at 283 (deferring as matter of stare decisis to Sixth Circuit's interpre-
tation of Tennessee law in Memphis Development); Memphis Development
Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 958-60 (6th Cir.) (interpreting Tennessee
law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). The position of the California Supreme Court on
this issue is somewhat unclear. Apparently, it either refuses to recognize a descendi-
ble right of publicity, or would recognize such a right only if it were exploited during
the holder's lifetime. Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 689 F.2d
317, 323 (2d Cir. 1982) (interpreting Lugosi decision); Factors, Etc., 652 F.2d at 284 n.1
(Mansfield, J., dissenting) (same). See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25
Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.
3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
For further discussion of this issue, see generally Felcher & Rubin, The
Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death? 89
YALE L.J. 1125 (1980); Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE .J. 1577 (1979); Hoffman, supra note 155, at 133-39 (op-
posing descendibility); Phillips, supra note 155, at 312-15; Pilpel, supra note 155, at 256-
60; Rader, supra note 155, at 233-38; Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the
Right of Publicity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 751 (1978).
166. See generally Hoffman, supra note 155, at 123-28; Phillips, supra note 155, at
304-08; Rader, supra note 155, at 238-41. A related question exists concerning possible
conflicts with federal copyright law. The prevailing view, however, appears to be that
the Copyright Act of 1976 does not preempt the state-based right of publicity. See But-
ton Master, 555 F. Supp. at 1201 (intangible proprietary interest protected by right of
publicity does not constitute writing and therefore falls outside preemption standards;
citing cases); Phillips, supra note 155, at 315-18 (copyright law does not preempt right
of publicity). See also Rader, supra note 155, at 241-43 (discussing issue).
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tours, a freely assignable right of publicity does inhere in any
individual whose name or likeness carries commercial value.
Artists and merchandisers have achieved considerable suc-
cess in employing this right to combat merchandise bootleg-
ging.167 The Bi-Rite case, discussed above, 168 is a noteworthy
example. Although the court rejected all of the plaintiffs'
trademark and unfair competition claims, it had little difficulty
finding actionable misappropriation of the plaintiffs' rights of
publicity. The court described the test for right of publicity
claims as requiring a plaintiff to show: (1) that his name or
likeness has publicity value; (2) that he exploited this value in
some overt manner; and (3) that the defendant appropriated
this right without consent for advertising or trade purposes.'69
As to the first two elements, the court found that the plaintiffs
were well-known performers who had "actively cultivated the
popularity of their names and music in an aggressively com-
petitive recording market."'170 While the court could find little
precedent for the recognition of a group's right of publicity, it
reasoned that "[a] group that develops market value in its per-
sona should be as entitled as an individual to publicity rights
in its name.' 71
As to the third element, the defendants admitted their unau-
thorized appropriation of the plaintiffs' names, but argued that
Bi-Rite had no right to assert the claim.172 The court rejected
this defense, ruling that Bi-Rite, as the performers' exclusive
licensee, had full standing to enforce their publicity rights. In
addition, the court observed that "[u]nlike privacy rights,
which protect personality and feelings and are therefore not
assignable, the right of publicity gives rise to a 'proprietary' in-
terest in the commercial value of one's persona which is as-
signable and may be freely licensed."'173 The court thus held
167. See, e.g., Button Master, 555 F. Supp. at 1198-1201; Creative Screen Design, 214
U.S.P.Q. at 190; Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1213-14.
168. See supra notes 145-53 and accompanying text.
169. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. at 1198-99. The court pointed out that exploitation
during the holder's lifetime would not be required in all jurisdictions. Id. at 1199.
170. Id. at 1199.
171. Id. (emphasis in original). Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 190 (recog-
nizing right of publicity of musical groups); Sileo, 528 F. Supp. at 1213 (same).
172. 555 F. Supp. at 1192. The defendants also argued-that many rock groups and
performers actually welcome the unauthorized use of their marks on buttons as a
source of free publicity. Id.
173. Id. at 1199. See also Creative Screen Design, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 190 (right of public-
ity may be validly transferred from entertainers to licensee).
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that the plaintiffs, having satisfied the three-part test, were en-
titled to damages and injunctive relief for the misappropriation
of their rights of publicity. 17 4
Even though merchandise bootlegging constitutes an obvi-
ous violation of an artist's right of publicity, this basis of relief
may be less satisfactory in several respects than that poten-
tially available under the Lanham Act. Most notably lacking is
any opportunity to receive treble damages. Attorney's fees
also are less likely to be recovered in a right of publicity action.
Finally, absent diversity jurisdiction or a pendent federal
claim, such a suit would have to be brought in state court.
IV
A Tale of Too Many T-Shirts: The Inadequacy of
Existing Remedies
That merchandise bootlegging clearly violates the legal
rights of artists and their licensees is beyond dispute. Yet, de-
spite the availability of remedies to enforce these rights, and
despite numerous attempts to do so, bootlegging activity re-
mains widespread in the music industry. Recent legal action
aimed at individual t-shirt peddlers and large printing houses
has been only partially effective. Artists and merchandisers
have succeeded, perhaps, in slowing the growth of the prob-
lem, but they have failed to diminish it significantly. Merchan-
dise bootleggers continue to reap millions of dollars annually
in illicit profits at the expense of performers and their author-
ized licensees. 175
Two related factors explain this failure. First, the bootleg-
gers themselves have proven flexible, sophisticated and resil-
ient. In the face of increasing legal action, they have adapted
accordingly, changing their methods of operation as the need
176 trarises. In terms of organization and numbers alone, they
make a formidable opponent for an artist or lawyer armed with
little more than a briefcase full of papers. Second, and more
significantly, the existing legal remedies simply were not
designed to effectively redress this type of activity.
177
174. Id. at 1199, 1201.
175. See supra notes 25-60 and accompanying text (discussing bootleg problem
generally).
176. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
177. This problem, as it applies to commercial counterfeiting generally, is discussed
extensively in Rakoff, supra note 17, at 161-77 & esp. 163-66.
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The laws of intellectual or intangible property-trademarks,
patents, copyrights, the right of publicity, and the like-gener-
ally presuppose a degree of good faith on the part of the parties
involved.'78 In a traditional trademark infringement action, for
example, the parties typically are legitimate businessmen en-
gaged in a bona fide dispute as to their respective rights to use
a particular mark. Bootleggers, on the other hand, are not "le-
gitimate" businessmen. They are more akin to professional
criminals who, fully aware of the illegality of their actions, act
so as to minimize their exposure should they be discovered.'79
As noted above, 80 merchandise bootleggers have few com-
punctions about ignoring injunctions, subpoenas, and discov-
ery orders, destroying evidence, perjuring themselves, and
generally "thumbing their noses" at the judicial system.181
Frequently, bootleggers will go underground, packing up their
shops and moving to a new location at the first sign of legal
action.182
While getting a bootlegger into court is no easy task, proving
liability and damages is close to impossible. Business records,
if any were kept, tend to be destroyed before they can be ob-
tained and introduced at trial.'83 Equipment and infringing
merchandise also may be hidden, moved, or destroyed, often in
violation of a court order. 84 Consequently, after months of in-
vestigation and litigation-all at considerable expense-a
plaintiff may find himself with no means by which to establish
infringement or the number of infringing sales and thus, no
case.
In one bootlegging case, Kenny Rogers Productions, Inc. v.
Grand Illusion Designs, Inc. ,185 for example, the plaintiffs ob-
tained an order for expedited discovery, only to find that the
178. See id. at 164.
179. Id. at 164-65; Zalon Affidavit I, supra note 41, at 5.
180. See supra notes 25-60 and accompanying text (discussing bootleg problem).
181. Id. See, e.g., Musidor, 658 F.2d at 62-64 (bootlegger violated injunction); Crea-
tive Screen Design,'210 U.S.P.Q. at 9 (same). In fact, according to the attorney who
prosecuted the contempt charges in Musidor, the defendants in that case, Leon
Dymburt and Great American Screen, are back in the bootlegging business, despite
having received sixty days in jail and a $10,000 fine respectively. Conversation with
Peter A. Herbert, Esq., in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 1983). See also Brockum Int'l, Inc.,
No. 82 Civ. 2948 (same defendants as in Musidor).
182. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. No. 80 Civ. 4428 (N.D. Ill.). See Zalon Affidavit I, supra note 41, at 3.
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defendants had removed all infringing equipment from the
premises before they could be inspected.186 The plaintiffs later
learned through a former employee of Grand Illusion that the
equipment had been removed just prior to the inspection and
returned soon afterwards. Based on this information, the
plaintiffs obtained an ex parte order resulting in the discovery
and inventory of the equipment. Before they actually could
take possession, however, the equipment was "accidentally"
destroyed. 8
7
Similarly, in Winterland Concessions Co. v. Creative Screen
Design, Ltd., discussed above, 88 Winterland obtained a tempo-
rary restraining order enjoining Creative from removing its
business records from the premises. 189  Although Creative
promptly violated the order, a Winterland investigator man-
aged to recover some records from the trash discarded by Cre-
ative and thus literally "salvaged" the case. 90 It was only
through this mixture of resourcefulness and fortuity that
Winterland ultimately was able to win almost $1 million in
treble damages and attorney's fees from Creative.' 91
Bootleggers also are adept at concealing their assets so as to
186. Zalon Affidavit I, supra note 41, at 3.
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
189. 210 U.S.P.Q. at 9.
190. Id.
191. 214 U.S.P.Q. at 191. See also Vuitton et Fils v. Crown Handbags, 492 F. Supp.
1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 622 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1980). Despite the availability of the
defendant's business records, the plaintiff in Vuitton was unable to establish what por-
tion of the defendant's total revenues were attributable to sales of counterfeit Vuitton
handbags. Id. at 1078. The defendant may have sold hundreds of counterfeit bags, but
Vuitton could not prove that the defendant had ever possessed more than six, the
number of bags offered for sale to Vuitton's investigator. Consequently, Vuitton was
awarded damages for only six infringing sales-a mere $210. Id.
In response to problems such as these, artists and merchandisers, as well as plain-
tiffs in traditional commercial counterfeiting cases, have begun to request and receive
ex parte search and seizure orders at the commencement of their suits. See Bainton,
supra note 19, at 22-25 (citing cases); Rakoff, supra note 17, at 166 & n.158, 209 & n.435.
Such cases now routinely proceed through "show cause" orders, allowing the plaintiffs
to obtain at least some potential evidence of infringement before the defendants even
know they have been sued. See supra note 69 (citing orders). Like the John Doe
seizure orders commonly employed at concert sites (see supra notes 65-101 and accom-
panying text), these orders constitute a truly extraordinary form of relief. Such meas-
ures, however, are entirely necessary if merchandise bootlegging and commercial
counterfeiting in general are to be halted. See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying
text (discussing need for legislative solution). For an analysis of the legal and consti-
tutional bases for such relief, see Rakoff, supra note 17, at 209-24.
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render themselves effectively judgment-proof. 192 An artist or
merchandiser may successfully prosecute an action against a
corporate bootlegger, only to find it completely insolvent. In
Billy Joel v. Big 0 Posters, Inc. ,193 for instance, the defendants
were major manufacturers of bootleg posters, with world-wide
distribution. Yet, within a few months after a preliminary in-
junction was entered against it, Big 0 went out of business,
selling all of its inventory to two "former secretaries. 119 4 Like-
wise, in Winterland, damages were assessed against only the
individual defendants because the corporate defendant had
entered Chapter VII bankruptcy a short time before the trial
assessing damages was to take place. 95
In short, the presently existing remedies offer little incentive
to artists and merchandisers to bring suit and little deterrence
to prospective bootleggers. The costs of investigating and pros-
ecuting such lawsuits can be extremely high. The likelihood of
recovering significant damages is, conversely, very low. For
artists and merchandisers, the remote probability of obtaining
a civil judgment against a possibly insolvent defendant may be
insufficient to justify bringing the action. 196 For bootleggers,
the lucrative rewards of their practice far outweigh the risks
involved. The possibility of civil liability may be viewed by
many as simply a cost of doing business. Although present
remedies may be well-suited for resolving traditional disputes
involving good faith parties, they are wholly inadequate to
combat the problem of merchandise bootlegging or commercial
counterfeiting in general.
V
Taking T-Shirts Seriously: The Need
for Legislation
Given the thriving nature of the bootlegging industry, it is
192. See Rakoff, supra note 17, at 165.
193. No. 80 Civ. 2365 (S.D.N.Y.). See Zalon Affidavit I, supra note 41, at 3.
194. Zalon Affidavit I, supra note 41, at 3-4.
195. 210 U.S.P.Q. at 9.
196. Even if a plaintiff recovers the full amount of his damages, he may not recoup
the costs of bringing the action. Attorney's fees and investigation costs are not ordina-
rily recoverable, and even under the Lanham Act, which specifically authorizes the
recovery of such costs as well as treble damages, these discretionary remedies are
rarely imposed. See Rakoff, supra note 17, at 163-64 & cases cited nn.138 & 141. But see




clear that additional remedies are necessary if artists and mer-
chandisers are to protect their legal rights adequately. On a
policy level, such additional protections are fully justified. It
has been argued that the interests of free and fair competition
militate against further expansion or enforcement of such ex-
clusive rights.'97 According to the president of the Brooklyn
printing firm Great American Screen Designs, bootleggers
would be willing to pay royalties on their sales if a mechanism
were established to channel them to artists.198 Great Ameri-
can's president, who was sentenced to sixty days in jail in the
Musidor case,199 insists that such legal harassment is part of a
scheme by large merchandisers to monopolize the market. He
contends that "[ijf the merchandisers stopped bootlegging,
kids still wouldn't buy [licensed] shirts. They're exorbitantly
priced and poorly made. It's a simple case of a few
powermongers trying to control the whole market."20
Similarly, one commentator, arguing for limitations on the
right of publicity, points out that the chief beneficiaries of such
protection are those who least need additional financial com-
pensation. 20 ' The "off-Broadway actor, the minor league hock-
ey player, the avant-garde jazzman, the author without a best
seller," he suggests, are unlikely to derive significant income
from the commercial licensing of their names or likenesses.
Rather, he maintains, it is "the Elvis Presleys, the Bela
Lugosis, the Agatha Christies of the world who benefit from
the right of publicity-and these are precisely the persons
whose income would be more than adequate even if publicity
rights were nonexistent. 2 2
That an artist may not need additional income, however, is
hardly a valid reason for not enforcing his legitimate legal
rights. In fact, given the high costs of touring, for many non-
"big-name" recording artists, sales of concert merchandise
generate a crucial component of their incomes that often repre-
sent the difference between profitability and losses on a con-
cert tour.20 3 Moreover, these arguments fail to consider the
nonfinancial aspects of merchandising that are protected by
197. See generally Hoffman, supra note 155, at 116-33 & esp. 122-23.
198. T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9.
199. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
200. T-Shirt Wars, supra note 9.
201. Hoffman, supra note 155, at 120.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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publicity and trademark rights. Primary among these, as
noted above,"' is the artist's reputational interest-his busi-
ness goodwill-in the products and services that bear his
name. Wholly aside from its financial impact, merchandise
bootlegging can seriously damage this interest when cheaply
made, poorly designed t-shirts are passed off as the artist's own
product. °5
The remaining question is how artists and merchandisers
can be adequately protected from bootlegging activity. Logi-
cally, the solution should come from the legislature. Without
further remedial legislation, the already overburdened courts
and law enforcement authorities can do little to alter the pres-
ent state of affairs. The situation requires a law with some
teeth in it--one that adequately deters bootleggers, and en-
sures that the rewards of taking action against them are suffi-
cient to justify the costs.
Such legislation could take many forms: an amendment to
present trademark laws, a statutory right of publicity, a specifi-
cally enacted criminal statute. Other possibilities exist, and
the problem can be addressed at the federal, state or even local
level.206 One bill now pending in Congress, a proposed Trade-
mark Counterfeiting Act,20 7 would amend the federal criminal
code to prohibit purposeful trafficking in counterfeit trade-
marks. 208 This proposed Act, specifically aimed at the problem
of commercial counterfeiting, prescribes criminal penalties of
imprisonment up to five years and fines up to $250,000 for indi-
viduals and $1,000,000 for corporations. 20 9 A corresponding pri-
vate right of action under the Act authorizes the mandatory
recovery of treble damages, the defendant's profits, and the
costs of investigating and prosecuting the suit, including rea-
204. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
205. Id.
206. An example of useful local legislation is the Birmingham, Alabama city ordi-
nance relied on in Rock Tours, Ltd. v. Does, 507 F. Supp. 63, 65 (N.D. Ala. 1981). See
supra note 84. That ordinance prohibited the sale of all merchandise within a specified
area outside the Birmingham Civic Center. Since authorized merchandise normally is
sold inside a concert hall, such an ordinance, if enforced, could effectively eliminate
concert site bootlegging in a given city. This type of legislation, though far from a na-
tional solution to the merchandise bootlegging problem and perhaps undesirable for
other reasons, demonstrates that the federal government is not the only entity capable
of addressing the situation.
207. See supra note 23.
208. Rakoff, supra note 17, at 177-88.
209. Id. at 195-98.
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sonable investigator's and attorney's fees.21° Civil plaintiffs
and federal prosecutors alike would be entitled to ex parte pre-
liminary injunctive relief, including the seizure of allegedly
counterfeit goods, without notice to the defendant.2 1'
Although merchandise bootlegging is a form of commercial
counterfeiting, the Act would apply only to the counterfeiting
of federally registered trademarks.212 Few popular recording
artists have obtained federal trademark registration for their
individual or group names.21 3 Moreover, it is doubtful whether
an artist's likeness would be entitled to any protection under
trademark laws.214 Thus, despite its strong deterrent provi-
sions, relief under the proposed Act may be unavailable to art-
ists and merchandisers. This problem, and the source-
confusion requirements noted above,21 make trademark laws
an uncertain weapon for combatting merchandise bootlegging.
A more fruitful source of legislative relief may lie in the com-
mon law right of publicity. Certainly it is this right of the artist
which is most clearly violated by merchandise bootlegging.21 6
The statutory codification of this right has been advocated by
commentators in the past,217 and the time may be ripe for seri-
ous consideration of this step. Although the right of publicity
is recognized in most American jurisdictions, 218 many aspects
of the right are in need of clear definition. The duration of the
right and its relationship with the first amendment are two ar-
eas that remain particularly unclear.219 Codifying legislation
could go a long way toward resolving these questions and es-
210. Id. at 198-209.
211. Id. at 209-15.
212. Id. at 188-91.
213. There would appear to be little reason why such artists could not obtain fed-
eral trademark registration for their names if they so desired. See supra note 123.
214. See generally KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 122, at 245-66 & esp. 250-51 (protec-
tion of pictures and symbols).
215. See supra notes 130-53 and accompanying text.
216. See generally supra notes 155-74 and accompanying text (discussing right of
publicity).
217. See, e.g., Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1355 n.10 (D.N.J. 1981)
(suggesting that New Jersey state legislature set durational limit on right of publicity);
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 847, 603 P.2d 425, 446, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 344
(1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (fixing date for termination of right of publicity is policy
decision best determined by legislature); Pilpel, supra note 155, at 262 (proposing that
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws formulate a model statute).
218. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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tablishing a uniform statutory right of publicity.220
Regardless of the legal theory on which it is based, such leg-
islation would need to contain a number of specific remedial
provisions if it is to be an effective weapon against merchan-
dise bootlegging. Many of these provisions can be found in the
proposed Trademark Counterfeiting Act discussed above.221
The possibility of recovering treble damages, profits, court
costs, investigation costs, and attorney's fees would provide
considerable incentive for artists and merchandisers to bring
legal action against bootleggers and help to even the odds in
such suits--odds that presently weigh heavily in favor of the
bootleggers.222 The Act's provision for ex parte seizure and in-
junctive relief, without notice to defendants, 223 is no doubt an
extraordinary measure, but also necessary if merchandise
bootlegging is to be halted. Without such a provision, business
records, equipment, and infringing merchandise are likely to
disappear before a lawsuit can even get off the ground. 2 4 De-
spite its extraordinary nature, ex parte injunctive relief is spe-
cifically authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,225
220. Although a unified national right of publicity undoubtedly would be desirable,
a federal jurisdictional basis may be lacking. The enactment of a uniform state act is
perhaps the most feasible solution. See Pilpel, supra note 155, at 262.
221. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
222. Although the recovery of treble damages, profits, costs, and attorney's fees is
mandatory under the proposed Act, this provision serves to punish a civil defendant
whose conduct by definition is willful and violative of the Act's criminal provisions.
See Rakoff, supra note 17, at 198-200. In a purely civil context, such a measure is less
justifiable. Treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees should be discretionary under
such a statute, except where the prohibited conduct is willful. Since, in the typical
merchandise bootlegging case, the defendant is fully aware that his activities violate
the plaintiff's rights, full recovery is ordinarily awarded.
223. Rakoff, supra note 17, at 209-15.
224. See supra notes 178-90 and accompanying text.
225. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) provides in relevant part:
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice
to the adverse party or his attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific
facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irrep-
arable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse
party or his attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attor-
ney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to
give the notice and the reasons supporting his claim that notice should not be
required.
Although the rules do not specifically provide for seizure without notice, Rule 64 autho-
rizes the seizure of property "under the circumstances and in the manner provided by
the law of the state in which the district court is held. . . [or] any [applicable] statute
of the United States .... " FED. R. Crv. P. 64. In conjunction with the above rules,
most seizure orders thus far issued have been grounded on section 36 of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (1976), which provides for the seizure and destruction of infringing
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and courts have granted such orders in numerous bootlegging
and commercial counterfeiting cases in the past.
226
The difficulty of proving damages in such cases can further
be addressed by taking a cue from the federal copyright code
which provides for statutory damages, at the plaintiffs elec-
tion, in lieu of proving actual damages and profits.227 A plaintiff
who establishes infringement may recover anywhere from $250
to $10,000, in the court's discretion, for each work infringed.228
In cases of willful infringement, statutory damages of up to
$50,000 may be awarded.229
Willful infringement of copyright also is deterred by criminal
provisions which impose severe penalties on one who infringes
a copyright "willfully and for purposes of commercial advan-
tage or private financial gain. '23 0 Depending on what type of
work he has infringed, a criminal copyright defendant can be
fined as much as $25,000 and imprisoned for up to one year-
$50,000 and two years for a subsequent offense. 231 A similar
provision in a right of publicity statute would have a substan-
tial deterrent effect on merchandise bootleggers who typically
act with full knowledge of the artist's rights and solely for pur-
poses of commercial gain.
VI
Conclusion
The problem of merchandise bootlegging probably appears
to the average person to be of relatively little importance. Yet,
it poses a serious threat to musical artists and their licensed
goods and equipment. See generally Rakoff, supra note 17, at 209-15. For a discussion
of the constitutional basis of such orders, see generally id. at 216-24.
226. See supra note 191.
227. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976). The Copyright Act also has been suggested as a
logical guideline for determining the duration of the right of publicity. The standard
copyright term of life plus fifty years, see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976), has been described
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merchandisers. The image of wealthy rock stars battling inno-
cent parking lot peddlers over the sales of a few cheap t-shirts
simply does not hold true. Merchandise bootleggers are so-
phisticated and well-organized, operating on a nationwide
scale with elaborate systems of distribution. Their activities
drain millions of dollars annually from the pockets of artists
and merchandisers at a time when merchandising revenues
have become increasingly important to an artist's financial
success.
Although merchandise bootlegging clearly violates the legal
rights of artists and licensed merchandisers, existing remedies
have proven inadequate to combat this illicit practice effec-
tively. Despite a good deal of creative lawyering by a number
of capable entertainment attorneys, the bootlegging industry
continues to thrive. Legislation addressing this problem
should be given serious consideration by lawmakers at the fed-
eral, state, and local levels. "T-shirt wars" may be little cause
for national concern, but blatant violations of legal rights can-
not so easily be ignored.
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